ASD is Clearly Preparing for a Quantum Future

National cryptological organizations, such as the NSA, CSE, GCHQ, ASD, and GCSB, routinely assess the strength of different modes of encryption and offer recommendations on what organizations should be using. They make their assessments based on the contemporary strength of encryption algorithms as well as based on the planned or expected vulnerabilities of those algorithms in the face of new or forthcoming technologies.

Quantum computing has the potential to undermine the security that is currently provided by a range of approved cryptographic algorithms.¹ On December 12, 2024, Australia’s ASD published a series of recommendations for what algorithms should be deprecated by 2030. What is notable about their decision is that they are proposing deprecations before other leading agencies, including the USA’s National Institute of Standards and Technology and Canada’s CSE, though with an acknowledgement that the deprecation is focused on High Assurance Cryptographic Equipment (HACE).

To-be-deprecated algorithms include:

• Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (EDHC)
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
• Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm 65 (ML-DSA-65)
• Module-Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation Mechanism 768 (ML-KEM-768)
• Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
• Secure Hashing Mechanisms 224 and 256 (SHA-224 and RSA-256)
• AES-128 and AES-192

Given that the English-speaking Five Eyes agencies regularly walk in near-lockstep we might see updated guidance from the different agencies in the coming weeks and months. Alternately, policy processes may prevent countries from updating their standards (or publicly announcing changes), leaving ASD as a path leader in cybersecurity while other agencies wait until policy mechanisms eventually lead to these algorithms being deprecated by 2035.

Looking further out, and aside from the national security space, the concerns around cryptographic algorithms speak to challenges that embedded systems will having in the coming decade where manufacturers fail to to get ahead of things and integrate quantum-resistance algorithms in the products they sell. Moreover, for embedded systems (e.g., Operational Technology, Internet of Things, and related systems) where it may be challenging or impossible to update cryptographic algorithms there may be a whole world of currently-secure solutions that will become woefully insecure in the not-so-distant future. That’s a future that we need to start planning for, today, so that at least a decade’s worth of work can hopefully head off the worst of the harms associated with deprecated embedded systems’ (in)security.