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How one rent-a-botnet army of cameras, DVRs caused Internet chaos

Ars Technica:

But even in the midst of the Dyn attack, some of the Mirai-infected devices were being used to attack another target—the infrastructure of a gaming company, according to Allison Nixon, the director of security research at security company Flashpoint. That idea matches up with what others who had some insight into the attack have told Ars confidentially—that it was also pointed at Sony’s PlayStation Network, which uses Dyn as a name service provider.

For now, it’s not clear that the attacks on Dyn and the PlayStation Network were connected. And with a criminal investigation underway, a Dyn spokesperson declined to confirm or deny that Sony was also a target. “We are continuing to work closely with the law enforcement community to determine the root cause of the events that occurred during the DDoS attacks last Friday,” Adam Coughlin, Dyn’s director of corporate communications, told Ars. “Since this is an ongoing investigation, we cannot speculate on these events.”

Regardless of the reasons behind it, the attack on Dyn further demonstrates the potential disruptive power of the millions of poorly protected IoT devices. These items can be easily turned into a platform for attacking anything from individual websites to core parts of the Internet’s infrastructure. And Mirai has demonstrated that it doesn’t take “zero-day” bugs to make it happen; attackers only need poorly implemented security on devices that can’t be easily fixed.

This is definitely one of the best writeups of the DDoS attacks launched againgst Dyn last week, which led to the downtime of major Internet properties. If you want to understand some of the security-related issues associated with the Internet of Things as well as challenges of attributing attacks to different attack infrastructures and intents, this is worth your time.

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Brace yourselves—source code powering potent IoT DDoSes just went public

Brace yourselves—source code powering potent IoT DDoSes just went public:

Both Mirai and Bashlight exploit the same IoT vulnerabilities, mostly or almost exclusively involving weakness involving the telnet remote connection protocol in devices running a form of embedded Linux known as BusyBox. But unlike Bashlight, the newer Mirai botnet software encrypts traffic passing between the infected devices and the command and control servers that feed them instructions. That makes it much harder for researchers to monitor the malicious network. There’s also evidence that Mirai is able to seize control of Bashlight-infected devices and possibly even patch them so they can never be infected again by a rival botnet. About 80,000 of the 963,000 Bashlight devices now belong to Mirai operators, Drew said.

Next time you see a vendor sell you something that can be connected to the Internet, be sure to ask:

  • How long will you be providing support for this product?
  • How will you be pushing security updates to this product?
  • What mitigation strategies have you implemented to ensure that a third-party doesn’t take control of this product?
  • What will you do to help me when this device is compromised because of a vulnerability in this product?

I can almost guarantee that whomever is selling the product will either look at you slackjawed or try to use buzzwords to indicate the product is secure. But they will almost certainly be unable to genuinely answer the questions because vendors are not securing their devices. It’s their failures which are have created the current generation of threats that the global Internet is just now starting to grapple with.

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Internet Census 2012

yostivanich:

While playing around with the Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) we discovered an amazing number of open embedded devices on the Internet. Many of them are based on Linux and allow login to standard BusyBox with empty or default credentials. We used these devices to build a distributed port scanner to scan all IPv4 addresses. These scans include service probes for the most common ports, ICMP ping, reverse DNS and SYN scans. We analyzed some of the data to get an estimation of the IP address usage.

Super interesting research, though incredibly illegal and borderline ethical (at absolute best, and most charitable).