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VW Leaks Geolocation Data

Contemporary devices collect vast sums of personal and sensitive information, and usually for legitimate purposes. However this means that there are an ever growing number of market participants that need to carefully safeguard the data they are collecting, using, retaining, or disclosing.

One of Volkswagen’s software development subsidiaries, Cariad, reportedly failed to adequately secure software installed in VW, Audi, Seat, and Skoda vehicles:

The sensitive information was left exposed on an unprotected and misconfigured Amazon cloud storage system for months – the problem has now been patched.

In some 466,000 of the 800,000 vehicles involved, location data was extremely precise so that anyone could track the driver’s daily routine. Spiegel reported that the list of owners includes German politicians, entrepreneurs, the entire EV fleet driven by Hamburg police, and even suspected intelligence service employees – so while nothing happened, it seriously could have been a lot worse.

This is a case where no clear harm has been detected. But it speaks more broadly of the continuing need for organizations to know what sensitive information they are collecting, the purposes of the collection, and need to establish adequate controls to protect collected and retained data.

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Computers-on-Wheels and Web-Based Vulnerabilities

While there can be significant efficiencies gained by increasing the amount of data that is accessible by motor vehicles, connecting these computers-on-wheels to the Internet can have notable consequences.

Recent reporting by Wired reveals, as an example, that:

… a group of independent security researchers revealed that they’d found a flaw in a web portal operated by the carmaker Kia that let the researchers reassign control of the internet-connected features of most modern Kia vehicles—dozens of models representing millions of cars on the road—from the smartphone of a car’s owner to the hackers’ own phone or computer. By exploiting that vulnerability and building their own custom app to send commands to target cars, they were able to scan virtually any internet-connected Kia vehicle’s license plate and within seconds gain the ability to track that car’s location, unlock the car, honk its horn, or start its ignition at will.

“If someone cut you off in traffic, you could scan their license plate and then know where they were whenever you wanted and break into their car,” says Curry. “If we hadn’t brought this to Kia’s attention, anybody who could query someone’s license plate could essentially stalk them.” For Kias that come installed with a 360-degree camera, that camera, too, was accessible to hackers. Beyond allowing the hijacking of connected features in cars themselves, Curry says, the web portal flaw also allowed hackers to query a broad range of personal information about Kia customers—names, email addresses, phone numbers, home addresses, and even past driving routes in some cases—a potentially massive data leak.

The nature of the vulnerability is particularly concerning:

When the researchers sent commands directly to the API of that website—the interface that allows users to interact with its underlying data—they say they found that there was nothing preventing them from accessing the privileges of a Kia dealer, such as assigning or reassigning control of the vehicles’ features to any customer account they created.

I do have to admit that I appreciate that this started with discovering issues with APIs used by scooters, which led the researchers to become “super interested in trying more ways to make more things honk.”

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Almost every Volkswagen sold since 1995 can be unlocked with an Arduino

Almost every Volkswagen sold since 1995 can be unlocked with an Arduino:

… security researchers have discovered how to use software defined radio (SDR) to remotely unlock hundreds of millions of cars. The findings are to be presented at a security conference later this week, and detail two different vulnerabilities.

The first affects almost every car Volkswagen has sold since 1995, with only the latest Golf-based models in the clear. Led by Flavio Garcia at the University of Birmingham in the UK, the group of hackers reverse-engineered an undisclosed Volkswagen component to extract a cryptographic key value that is common to many of the company’s vehicles.

Alone, the value won’t do anything, but when combined with the unique value encoded on an individual vehicle’s remote key fob—obtained with a little electronic eavesdropping, say—you have a functional clone that will lock or unlock that car.

Just implement the research by dropping some Raspberry Pi’s in a mid- to high-income condo parking garage and you’ve got an easy way to profit pretty handsomely from Volkswagen’s security FUBAR.