Categories
Writing

The DEA, iMessage, and the Broader Significance

It’s been widely reported that the DEA San Jose office is unable to conduct surveillance of Apple iMessages. The note is revealing in its very phrasing; the author(s) state that:

While it is impossible to intercept iMessages between two Apple devices, iMessages between an Apple device and a non-Apple device are transmitted as Short Message Service (SMS) messages and can sometimes be intercepted, depending on where the intercept is placed. The outcome seems to be more successful if the intercept is placed on the non-Apple device. (emphasis added)

Note that despite the ‘encryption’ the agent(s) recognize that they can sometimes intercept messages. Importantly they are ‘more successful’ when the intercept is on the non-Apple device. Their phrasing suggests one of the following:

  1. Authorities are occasionally able to intercept messages between Apple devices; or
  2. Authorities are occasionally able to intercept messages that are inbound to an Apple device that are sent from a non-Apple device.

Either situation is interesting, insofar as the former raises questions of the efficacy of Apple’s encryption process and the latter questions about where a tap is placed pre-encryption in the Apple network.

More broadly, however, the challenge facing the DEA is one that is already encountered by investigators around the world. In fact, the DEA is in a pretty envious position: most of the major ‘messaging’ companies have some degree of corporate presence in the US and can thus be easily served with a wiretap order. Sure, a host of orders might need to be issued (one to Apple, one to Facebook, one to Google, etc etc) but this is a possible course of action.

Officers outside of the US that want similar access to messages that flow outside of SMS channels experience a different reality. They tend to need a MLAT or other cross-national warrant might be needed. Such warrants are incredibly time consuming and, as a result, resource intensive. These kinds of pressures are, in part, responsible for the uptick in discussions around state agents serving malware to mobile and fixed computing systems: it just isn’t practical to ‘wiretap’ many of these communications anymore, on the basis that the companies running the services are beyond the authorities’ jurisdictions.

So, while encryption is (fortunately) becoming more and more common, this isn’t necessarily the ‘solution’ to third-parties intercepting communications. Indeed, all it means is that attackers (in this case, the state) are targeting the far softer domains of the communications infrastructure: everything around the encryption layer itself.

Categories
Aside

NYT and TLS/SSL

Those moments when big sites seem to seriously screw up their SSL certs

Categories
Links

On Masons, Cryptography, and History

Wired has a terrific piece that details how a secret order in the 18th century used a combination of cryptography, obfuscation, and operational secrecy to either spy on the Masons, or keep the Masonic traditions and rituals alive during a time of persecution. It’s a longer read, but worth your time. Wired’s article also demonstrates the value of academic freedom: it gives scholars the ability to explore and solve intriguing problems. Their work may never provide a monetary ‘return on investment’ but it will likely enrich society and culture nevertheless .

Categories
Quotations

2012.10.30

It’s very complicated. It’s very cumbersome. There’s a lot of numbers involved with it.

Gov. Nikki Haley’s reason for why social security numbers stolen by a hacker weren’t encrypted
Categories
Links

iMessage and ‘Secure’ Communications

Matthew Green has a good piece that discusses some of the security concerns around iMessage. Specifically he speaks to how, despite Apple’s assurances that it employs “secure end-to-end encryption,” the company still hasn’t properly explained how its encryption processes are established or deployed. Green does a good job explaining these concerns for a very non-technical audience. Highly recommended, especially if you happen to be using iMessage.

Categories
Links

When It Comes to Human Rights, There Are No Online Security Shortcuts

Patrick Ball has a good and highly accessible article over on Wired about why certain means of securing communications are problematic. It’s highly recommended. Rather than leave you with the overview of “this is what is said and why it’s important,” let me leave you with a key quotation from the article that (to my mind) nicely speaks to the author’s general mindset: “Good security is about not trusting people. It’s about studying math and software and assuring that the program cannot be turned to bad intent.”

Categories
Links Writing

Some Literature on Skype Security

Chris Soghoian has a good piece breaking down what we know, and don’t know, about Skype’s VoIP security. While not mentioned, it’s helpful to keep in mind that the security and anonymity offered by Skype is questionable regardless of whether the company provides a private key/enables MITM/etc for law enforcement agencies. Such questions are, and have been raised by academics for some time, as evidenced by the body of academic research on Skype and security.

To be clear: the following list is not a comprehensive accounting of literature that has been critical of Skype or VoIP encryption. Instead, the list is meant to show that researchers have been evaluating Skype’s security promises for a very long time. The present controversy around Skype’s security stance – i.e. can or can’t the company decrypt VoIP communications for law enforcement – should be read as an ongoing part of this narrative instead of as a revelatory moment that “changes everything.”

Phonotactic Reconstruction of Encrypted VoIP Conversations: Hookt on fon-iks (2011)

Abstract: In this work, we unveil new privacy threats against Voice-over-IP (VoIP) communications. Although prior work has shown that the interaction of variable bit-rate codecs and length-preserving stream ciphers leaks information, we show that the threat is more serious than previously thought. In particular, we derive approximate transcripts of encrypted VoIP conversations by segmenting an observed packet stream into subsequences representing individual phonemes and classifying those subsequences by the phonemes they encode. Drawing on insights from the computational linguistics and speech recognition communities, we apply novel techniques for unmasking parts of the conversation. We believe our ability to do so underscores the importance of designing secure (yet efficient) ways to protect the confidentiality of VoIP conversations.

Analysis of information leakage from encrypted Skype conversations (2010)

Abstract: Voice over IP (VoIP) has experienced a tremendous growth over the last few years and is now widely used among the population and for business purposes. The security of such VoIP systems is often assumed, creating a false sense of privacy. This paper investigates in detail the leakage of information from Skype, a widely used and protected VoIP application. Experiments have shown that isolated phonemes can be classified and given sentences identified. By using the dynamic time warping (DTW) algorithm, frequently used in speech processing, an accuracy of 60% can be reached. The results can be further improved by choosing specific training data and reach an accuracy of 83% under specific conditions. The initial results being speaker dependent, an approach involving the Kalman filter is proposed to extract the kernel of all training signals.

Recovery of Skype Application Activity Data from Physical Memory (2010)

Abstract: The use of Internet based communication technologies has become more prevalent in recent years. Technologies such as Skype provide a highly secure and decentralised method of communication. These technologies may also leave little evidence on static media causing conventional digital forensic processes to be ineffective. This research looks at exploiting physical memory to recover evidence from Internet based communication technologies where conventional methods cannot. The paper first proposes a set of generic target artefacts that defines information that may be targeted for recovery and the meaning that can be inferred from this. A controlled test was then undertaken where Skype was executed and the memory from the target machine collected. The analysis showed that it is feasible to recover the target data as applied to Skype, which would not be otherwise available. As this is the first set of tests of a series, the future direction is also discussed.

Blocking Skype through Deep Packet Inspection (2009)

Abstract: Skype is a peer-to-peer (P2P) voice over IP (VOIP) chat program. It provides its clients with an inexpensive means to communicate worldwide via the Internet through wired and wireless networks. In the past this application was limited strictly to computers, yet with continuous advancements in mobile communication, Skype phones and other mobile devices have recently hit the market in an attempt to capitalize on Skype’s reliable connection algorithms. However, despite the success of this application, it is important to note that due to Skype’s connection algorithm and the nature of P2P, a number of vulnerabilities emerge that threaten both users and their networks. This paper outlines how to block the Skype application through the use of deep packet inspection. This novel approach is completely scalable to networks of any size as a means of blocking one of the largest threats to commercial and government networks today.

Identifying Skype Traffic by Random Forest (2007)

Abstract: Despite of the great popularity, little is known about Skype network attributed to proprietary protocol. End-to-end encryption disables the traditional traffic detection methods. We presented genetic algorithm based Random Forest algorithm to identify Skype traffic using only transport layer statistics. Experimental results show that the proposed approach can immune to the encryption of the payload and be capable of detecting Skype traffic with accuracy over 95% while low computational complexity is required.

Revealing skype traffic: when randomness plays with you (2007)

Abstract: Skype is a very popular VoIP software which has recently attracted the attention of the research community and network operators. Following a closed source and proprietary design, Skype protocols and algorithms are unknown. Moreover, strong encryption mechanisms are adopted by Skype, making it very difficult to even glimpse its presence from a traffic aggregate. In this paper, we propose a framework based on two complementary techniques to reveal Skypetraffic in real time. The first approach, based on Pearson’sChi-Square test and agnostic to VoIP-related trafficcharacteristics, is used to detect Skype’s fingerprint from the packet framing structure, exploiting the randomness introduced at the bit level by the encryption process. Conversely, the second approach is based on a stochastic characterization of Skype traffic in terms of packet arrival rate and packet length, which are used as features of a decision process based on Naive Bayesian Classifiers.In order to assess the effectiveness of the above techniques, we develop an off-line cross-checking heuristic based on deep-packet inspection and flow correlation, which is interesting per se. This heuristic allows us to quantify the amount of false negatives and false positives gathered by means of the two proposed approaches: results obtained from measurements in different networks show that the technique is very effective in identifying Skype traffic. While both Bayesian classifier and packet inspection techniques are commonly used, the idea of leveraging on randomness to reveal traffic is novel. We adopt this to identify Skype traffic, but the same methodology can be applied to other classification problems as well.

VoIP and Skype Security (2005)

A critical evaluation of Skype’s security stance as juxtaposed against other peer-to-peer models, ISDN/VoIP services, and what we can take away from Skype’s claims about encryption and voice security.

Skype Security Evaluation (2005)

Since 1 June 2005 I have been analyzing the security properties of Skype software and services, with a focus on the current and planned uses of cryptography. I have had unimpeded access to Skype engineers and to Skype source code. I have found out a lot about Skype. The more I found out, the happier I became.

Any pieces of literature you think are absolute must adds to this list?

Categories
Writing

Comment on Lion’s Internet Recovery

I’ve recently added a new non-spinning disk to my system and decided to give Lion’s disk recovery system a try: how did it actually perform, where were there problems, and how were they resolved?

I was incredibly impressed with the general functionality of the Internet-based recovery mechanism. After adding the new disk I was asked to connect to a local wireless network and then basic recovery data was streamed into RAM. From there I successfully downloaded and installed the OS, and restored files and settings from encrypted network storage. Total time to restore the OS and about 200GB of data: 3.5 hours.

Were there any problems? Yes, though only one is truly significant to my mind. While the password for logging into the OS remained the drive encryption that I’d set up through the OS (i.e. Filevault 2) had to be re-intitialized. When I attempted to do so I received warnings that the disk could not be encrypted.

This constituted a major problem for me.

The solution was relatively simple, though annoying. Apparently the Internet-based recovery process fails to install a recovery partition on the disk. Without this partition Filevault 2 cannot be enabled. The solution was to reinstall Lion from within the OS. This doesn’t change any settings and, effectively, is just used to create the disk-based recovery partition. After the partition is set up Filevault 2 can be enabled without a problem.

I don’t have a particular issue with having to jump through some hoops to re-enable the disk encryption. I do, however, have issues with the fact that there are no warnings that this security setting isn’t enabled/carried through when re-installing Lion and importing data and settings from a Time Capsule. In effect, if I wasn’t poking around settings to ascertain whether they had been carried over I likely would have never known that the disk hadn’t been encrypted. This is a particularly serious information flow error as far as I’m concerned. Hopefully Apple will integrate some kind of a notice system in the future to alert users about which settings were and were not carried over, as well as more verbosity concerning why Filevault 2 cannot be enabled after an Internet-based OS restoration.

Categories
Aside Links

SandForce Controllers and Encryption

Rob Graham has a good look at the challenges facing SandForce controllers – which are used by a large number of the solid state hard drives on the consumer market – as related to disk encryption. I highly recommend reading it but, if you just don’t have the time, here’s the key takeaway: “The problem with a SandForce controller is that all its features are lost when using full disk encryption, but all its downsides remain. Thus, if you plan on using an SSD for your notebook computer, you should plan on getting something other than a SandForce controller.”

Categories
Writing

A Glimpse Into How ‘Normals’ Read the Internet

I use the term ‘normals’ in an utterly positive sense: Vanity Fair’s recent piece, titled “World War 3.0,” scatters enough truth through the article that it possesses a veneer of credibility while obfuscating falsehoods and myths. The result is that unsavvy readers will be left with conceptions the everything is peachy with ICANN (false), that the ITU is coming to take over the ‘net (false), that the Internet is boundary-less (false), that there are honest-to-God “good guys” (the disorderly folks) and villains (orderly organizations like states), and that loosening arms exports related to encryption is significantly linked to the theft of IP (arguably very false).

Unfortunately, there is enough truth scattered throughout the article that someone who isn’t familiar with the terrains of Internet security, governance, and IP policies could be easily drawn into an appealing and accessible narrative. It is precisely narratives like this that those of us familiar with Internet policies have to fervently oppose and correct, with a recognition that not correcting the record can promote serious misinformation leading to disastrous (or, at best, misguided) policy responses by the “bad guys” of the Internet (i.e. state actors).

The article is worth a read, though it may bring your blood to a boil. Regardless of its factual accuracy, however, I suspect that the piece can be read as how non-experts perceive the past decade or so of Internet policies and practices. As such it’s incredibly valuable for those of us in the trenches to get a better perspective on how our conflicts are seen publicly, if only to make out actions and processes that much clearer for the general citizenry.