Category: Links

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Presto bringing big ideas – and maybe free coffee – to TTC riders

Presto bringing big ideas – and maybe free coffee – to TTC riders:

Privacy concerns

While few can argue with the prospect of a less-cramped streetcar, one Toronto-based privacy advocate has some concerns about the TTC tracking his trips.

“The use of aggregate rider data can be really helpful in terms of figuring out how to improve transit,” said Christopher Parsons, a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab.

“But the question is what minimal amount of data is necessary to collect for that planning, and is there a way to authenticate Presto cards that maximally protects individuals’ privacy?”

A spokesperson for Metrolinx told Metro that riders have the option of using Presto cards even if they haven’t registered any of their personal information.

That’s good, Parsons said, but it may not be enough.

“If you’re looking at large datasets, you can start picking out individuals based on just one or two other data points,” he said.

Ultimately, any technology like Presto involves some measure of surveillance, and Parsons says he believes it will be up to riders to decide whether the benefits of the card outweigh any concerns.

“That’s a choice Torontonians will have to make,” he said.

 

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Spies Know What You’re Downloading on Filesharing Sites, New Snowden Docs Show

Spies Know What You’re Downloading on Filesharing Sites, New Snowden Docs Show:

Where is all this data coming from?

Rather than monitor each file sharing company individually, the documents hint at a “special source” known only by the codename ATOMIC BANJO, which is responsible for the collection of “HTTP metadata” from 102 known file sharing sites (Sendspace, Rapidshare, and the now-defunct Megaupload are the only three identified by name).

“‘Special Source’ typically refers to access to corporate data stores, or corporate data flows, so ISPs or data centers or something like that. Trans-atlantic cables,” said Christopher Parsons, a postdoctoral fellow at the Citizen Lab, which studies surveillance and other digital policy issues within the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs. “Access is predicated on either contractual term or a monetary payment or something of that nature. Which is to say that someone or some individuals within the special source organizations are aware of what’s going on.”

…

As for CSE, a document released by Ge​rman newspaper Der Spiegel earlier this month describes a “cyber threat detection platform” called EONBLUE. According to the document, EONBLUE had been under development for over eight years as of November 2010—the date the document was published—and is made up of over 200 sensors deployed across the globe using “collection programs including S​PECIALSOURCE.”

What makes EONBLUE significant, said Parsons, is that we now know “Canada has sites around the world. And based on previous documents around special source operations, we quite often see large volumes of data being accessed. So it’s possible that EONBLUE is similarly used to access large quantities of data.”

One of EONBLUE’s capabilities is the collection of metadata. It is not clear whether the metadata collected from ATOMIC BANJO is related to the metadata produced by EONBLUE.

“It’s certainly possible, but there’s no definitive evidence, that would indicate a direct correlation,” Parsons said.

 

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Links Writing

New Additions to the Canadian SIGINT Summaries

I’ve added three new items to the Canadian SIGINT Summaries. The Summaries include downloadable copies of leaked Communications Security Establishment documents, along with summary, publication, and original source information (CSE).1 CSE is Canada’s foreign signals intelligence agency and has operated since the Second World War.

Documents were often produced by CSE’s closest partners which, collectively, form the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence network. This network includes the CSE, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD),2 and Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)).

All of the documents are available for download from this website. Though I am hosting the documents they were all first published by another party. The new documents and their summaries are listed below. The full list of documents and their summary information is available on the Canadian SIGINT Summaries page.

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Links Writing

Draft Paper: Do Transparency Reports Matter for Public Policy?

Telecommunications companies across Canada have begun to release transparency reports to explain what data the companies collect, what data they retain and for how long, and to whom that data is, or has been, disclosed to. This article evaluates the extent to which Canadian telecommunications companies’ transparency reports respond to a set of public policy goals, namely: of contextualizing information about government surveillance actions, of legitimizing the corporate disclosure of data about government-mandated surveillance actions, and of deflecting or responding to telecommunications subscribers’ concerns about how their data is shared between companies and the government. In effect, have the reports been effective in achieving the aforementioned goals or have they just having the effect of generating press attention?

After discussing the importance of transparency reports generally, and the specificities of the Canadian reports released in 2014, I argue that companies must standardize their reports across the industry and must also publish their lawful intercept handbooks for the reports to be more effective. Ultimately, citizens will only understand the full significance of the data published in telecommunications companies’ transparency when the current data contained in transparency reports is be contextualized by the amount of data that each type of request can provide to government agencies and the corporate policies dictating the terms under which such requests are made and complied with.

Download Telecommunications Transparency in Canada 1.4 (Public Draft) (Alternate SSRN link)

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Links Writing

The Canadian SIGINT Summaries | Technology, Thoughts & Trinkets

The Canadian SIGINT Summaries | Technology, Thoughts & Trinkets :

Journalists with access to leaked documents have reported on the partnerships and activities undertaken by Canada’s foreign signals intelligence (SIGINT) agency, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), since October 2013. As a result of their stories we know that the Canadian government hosts collection facilities in its diplomatic outposts for American SIGINT operations, has co-ordinated with the NSA to monitor for threats to international summits that took place in Canada, and shares a cooperative relationship with the National Security Agency (NSA) to protect North America from foreign threats. CSE, itself, was found to be conducting signals intelligence and development operations against the Brazilian government, running experiments using domestically collected metadata to track Canadians’ devices, and automating both the discovery of vulnerable computer devices on the Internet for later exploitation and identifying network administrators’ Internet traffic.

The aforementioned revelations are just a sample of what Canadians have learned as journalists have reported on documents leaked to them by Edward Snowden and other whistleblowers. But it has been challenging for even experts to keep track of the Canadian discoveries amongst the tidal wave of information concerning American and British SIGINT agencies. I have created and published a resource to help researchers and members of the public alike track mentions of CSE in documents that have been reported on by professional journalists.

Curious what has been revealed about Canada’s signals intelligence agency since Edward Snowden’s revelations began in summer 2013? Then check out The Canadian SIGINT Summaries. They’ll be updated as more information is available!

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Privacy issues could not be ignored in 2014 (video)

This links to the full video interview I gave to Postmedia about privacy issues in 2014. On the whole I’m actually pretty optimistic about things: we know more than in the past about the extents to which governments engage in surveillance. The organizations and individuals who subsequently act on this knowledge are more capable, today, than they were even two years ago. And the political class is increasingly aware that privacy and transparency issues are becoming more and more important to their constituents.

Now, does this optimism mean that things will necessarily improve dramatically in 2015? Of course not. But momentum continues to build and more and more individuals and organizations are taking privacy issues seriously. And that’s cause for some celebration as far as I’m concerned.

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Privacy issues could not be ignored in 2014 (Transcript Summary)

Privacy issues could not be ignored in 2014 (Transcript Summary):

Telecom and online security expert Christopher Parsons, post-doctoral fellow at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab and director of the Telecom Transparency Project, reviews how Canadians’ shifted in 2014 and what to expect in the new year.

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U.S. Cyber Command investment ensures hackers targeting America face retribution

U.S. Cyber Command investment ensures hackers targeting America face retribution :

Later that summer, Marine Lt. Gen. Richard P. Mills bluntly told a conference in Baltimore that commanders under his control in Afghanistan routinely used cyberwarfare tactics to attack and disable al Qaeda and Taliban enemies.

“I can tell you that as a commander in Afghanistan in the year 2010, I was able to use my cyberoperations against my adversary with great impact,” Gen. Mills was quoted at the time as saying. “I was able to get inside his nets, infect his command and control, and in fact defend myself against his almost constant incursions to get inside my wire, to affect my operations.”

While the military is developing the capability, the political and policy realm is struggling with the right parlance.

If that’s the language that US generals are using to explain what ‘cyber’ is then I think that the executive-class is clueless about the things that their ‘cyberwarriors’ are up to. And if they’re this clueless then how can they be relied on (or quoted in anything other than a mocking way?) to provide expert advice to policy makers, politicians, or the public?

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Hacking Our Humanity: Sony, Security and the End of Privacy

Hacking Our Humanity: Sony, Security and the End of Privacy :

The lesson here isn’t that Hollywood executives, producers, agents and stars must watch themselves. It isn’t to beware of totalitarian states. It’s to beware, period. If it isn’t a foreign nemesis monitoring and meddling with you, then it’s potentially a merchant examining your buying patterns, an employer trawling for signs of disloyalty or indolence, an acquaintance turned enemy, a random hacker with an amorphous grudge — or of course the federal government.

And while this spooky realization prompts better behavior in certain circumstances that call for it and is only a minor inconvenience in other instances, make no mistake: It’s a major loss. Those moments and nooks in life that permit you to be your messiest, stupidest, most heedless self? They’re quickly disappearing if not already gone.

Though I find various aspects of Bruni’s article insulting (e.g. “…the flesh that Jennifer Lawrence flashed to more people than she ever intended…”) the discussion of who are the most common threat actors that people have to worry about is a fair point. It’s also important to discuss, and discuss regularly, that the ‘defences’ which are commonly preached to protect our privacy are fraught with risk. While being silent, not associating with one another, or not reading certain things online might keep one ‘safe’, engaging in such censorious activities runs counter to the freedoms that we ought to cherish.

Such responses ignore the costs — often paid in blood or years of people’s lives— that have gone into fighting for the freedoms that we now enjoy and that are engrained in our constitutions, our laws, and our social norms. They forget the men and women who fight and die on battlefields to protect the freedoms of citizens of other nations. And, perhaps most significantly, such responses demonstrate how larger social movements directed at enshrining our freedoms through collective action are set aside, often cynically, so that we can try and resolve the problems we all face as individuals instead of as collective political actors. Self-censorship isn’t just a means of ensuring self-protection; it’s an exhibition of citizens’ unwillingness to at try and utilize our political processes to resolve common social ills.

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Public and private sector companies vulnerable to Sony-like attacks

Public and private sector companies vulnerable to Sony-like attacks :

Christopher Parsons, the managing director of a telecom transparency project in The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto, said agrees with Tobok; it’s not enough for companies to leave digital security to their designated IT employees or mid-level management.

“It’s an increasingly serious issue; companies not treating it at the top do so at their own peril.”

Bigger security breaches are a reality of a more digitally-literate world, Parsons said.

“If you’re dealing with a well-resourced attacker with lots of time, there’s a reasonable chance they will find some way through.”

That’s why companies also need to invest in a strong remediation strategy in case an attack does occur, he said.

I should be particularly emphatic on one point: the hack of Sony does not constitute ‘cyberwar’. To begin, the very definition of the term is ambiguous at best. Moreover, the attack on a non-critical-systems company cannot be understood as an assault on critical infrastructure systems (e.g. dams, power grids, etc) that could be interpreted as an undeclared war-like action. What has happened to Sony is a corporate tragedy and one for the textbooks on remediation and mitigation strategies. To be clear: this is a lesson for business and security textbooks, not military strategy textbooks.

Claims that the attacks on Sony are some kind of ‘warlike’ behaviour operate on the assumption that we can attribute who is responsible for the attacks. We are unable to so ascribe action at the moment. And until the NSA or the other SIGINT agencies pull stuff from their bags of tricks to more positively establish a link between the attacks on Sony and a specific nation-state threat actor with obvious war-based intentionality, any calls that we are witnessing some kind of ‘cyberwar’ are ill-considered at best, and outright ignorant at worst.

Or, alternately, such calls might constitute efforts on the parts of those with Top Secret/Special Compartmentalized information to raise awareness about some kind of ‘behind the scenes’ action. I strongly doubt those calling the Sony attacks cyberwar have access to such kinds of deeply sensitive operational, and classified, information. But perhaps I’m wrong. And, if I am, I hope they’re leaking with authorization or have particularly terrific counsel to defend them against allegations of leaking classified information.