Detecting Academic National Security Threats

Photo by Pixabay on Pexels.com

The Canadian government is following in the footsteps of it’s American counterpart and has introduced national security assessments for recipients of government natural science (NSERC) funding. Such assessments will occur when proposed research projects are deemed sensitive and where private funding is also used to facilitate the research in question. Social science (SSHRC) and health (CIHR) funding will be subject to these assessments in the near future.

I’ve written, elsewhere, about why such assessments are likely fatally flawed. In short, they will inhibit student training, will cast suspicion upon researchers of non-Canadian nationalities (and especially upon researchers who hold citizenship with ‘competitor nations’ such as China, Russia, and Iran), and may encourage researchers to hide their sources of funding to be able to perform their required academic duties while also avoiding national security scrutiny.

To be clear, such scrutiny often carries explicit racist overtones, has led to many charges but few convictions in the United States, and presupposes that academic units or government agencies can detect a human-based espionage agent. Further, it presupposes that HUMINT-based espionage is a more serious, or equivalent, threat to research productivity as compared to cyber-espionage. As of today, there is no evidence in the public record in Canada that indicates that the threat facing Canadian academics is equivalent to the invasiveness of the assessments, nor that human-based espionage is a greater risk than cyber-based means.

To the best of my knowledge, while HUMINT-based espionage does generate some concerns they pale in comparison to the risk of espionage linked to cyber-operations.

However, these points are not the principal focus of this post. I recently re-read some older work by Bruce Schneier that I think nicely casts why asking scholars to engage in national security assessments of their own, and their colleagues’, research is bound to fail. Schneier wrote the following in 2007, when discussing the US government’s “see something, say something” campaign:

[t]he problem is that ordinary citizens don’t know what a real terrorist threat looks like. They can’t tell the difference between a bomb and a tape dispenser, electronic name badge, CD player, bat detector, or trash sculpture; or the difference between terrorist plotters and imams, musicians, or architects. All they know is that something makes them uneasy, usually based on fear, media hype, or just something being different.

Replace “terrorist” with “national security” threat and we get to approximately the same conclusions. Individuals—even those trained to detect and investigate human intelligence driven espionage—can find it incredibly difficult to detect human agent-enabled espionage. Expecting academics, who are motivated to develop international and collegial relationships, who may be unable to assess the national security implications of their research, and who are being told to abandon funding while the government fails to supplement that which is abandoned, guarantees that this measure will fail.

What will that failure mean, specifically? It will involve incorrect assessments and suspicion being aimed at scholars from ‘competitor’ and adversary nations. Scholars will question whether they should work with a Chinese, Russian, or Iranian scholar even when they are employed in a Western university let alone when they are in a non-Western institution. I doubt these same scholars will similarly question whether they should work with Finish, French, or British scholars. Nationality and ethnicity lenses will be used to assess who are the ‘right’ people with whom to collaborate.

Failure will not just affect professors. It will also extend to affect undergraduate and graduate students, as well as post-doctoral fellows and university staff. Already, students are questioning what they must do in order to prove that they are not considered national security threats. Lab staff and other employees who have access to university research environments will similarly be placed under an aura of suspicion. We should not, we must not, create an academy where these are the kinds of questions with which our students and colleagues and staff must grapple.

Espionage is, it must be recognized, a serious issue that faces universities and Canadian businesses more broadly. The solution cannot be to ignore it and hope that the activity goes away. However, the response to such threats must demonstrate necessity and proportionality and demonstrably involve evidence-based and inclusive policy making. The current program that is being rolled out by the Government of Canada does not meet this set of conditions and, as such, needs to be repealed.

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Canadian Genocide

The history of Canada is linked to settle colonialism and white supremacy. Only recently have elements of Canada come to truly think through what this means: Canada, and settler Canadians, owe their existence to the forceful removal of indigenous populations from their terrorities.

Toronto is currently hosting an art exhibit, “Built on Genocide.” It’s created by the indigenous artist, Jay Soule | CHIPPERWAR,1 and provides a visual record of the link between the deliberate decimation of the buffalo and its correlation with the genocide of indigenous populations. From the description of the exhibit:

Built on Genocide is a powerful visual record of the 19th-century buffalo genocide that accompanied John A. MacDonald’s colonial expansion west with the railroad. In the mid-19th century, an estimated 30 to 60 million buffalo roamed the prairies, by the late 1880s, fewer than 300 remained. As the buffalo were slaughtered and the prairie ecosystem decimated, Indigenous peoples were robbed of their foods, lands, and cultures. The buffalo genocide became a genocide of the people.

Working from archival records, Soule combines installation and paintings to connect the past with the present, demanding the uncomfortable acknowledgement that Canada is a nation built on genocide.

What follows are a series of photographs that I made while visiting the exhibit on October 13, 2021. All images were made using an iPhone 12 Pro using the ‘Noir’ filter in Apple Photos, and subsequently edited using a Darkroom App filter.

Canada is, and needs to be, going through a reckoning concerning its past. This process is challenging for settlers, both to appreciate their actual histories and to be made to account for how they arrived at their current life situations. There are, obviously, settlers who are in challenging life situations—som experience poverty and are otherwise disadvantaged in society—but their challenges routinely pale in comparison to what is sadly normal and typical in Canada’s indigenous societies. As just one example, while poverty is a real issue for some white and immigrant Canadians, few lack routine access to safe and clean drinking water. None have lacked access to safe and clean water for over 26 years but this is the lived reality of indigenous populations in Canada.


  1. Jay creates art under the name CHIPPEWAR, which represents the hostile relationship that Canada’s Indigenous peoples have with the government of the land they have resided in since their creation. CHIPPEWAR is also a reminder of the importance of the traditional warrior role that exists in Indigenous cultures across North America that survives into the present day. ↩︎

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The Lawfare Dimension of Asymetrical Conflict

The past week has seen a logjam begin to clear in Canadian-Chinese-American international relations. After agreeing to the underlying facts associated with her (and Huawei’s) violation of American sanctions that have been placed on Iran, Meng Wanzhou was permitted to return to China after having been detained in Canada for several years. Simultaneously, two Canadian nationals who had been charged with national security crimes were themselves permitted to return to Canada on health-related grounds. The backstory is that these Canadians were seized shortly following the detainment of Huawei’s CFO, with the Chinese government repeatedly making clear that the Canadians were being held hostage and would only be released when the CFO was repatriated to China.

A huge amount of writing has taken place following the swap. But what I’ve found to be particular interesting in terms of offering a novel contribution to the discussions was an article by Julian Ku in Lawfare. In his article, “China’s Successful Foray Into Asymmetric Lawfare,” Ku argues that:

Although Canadians are relieved that their countrymen have returned home, the Chinese government’s use of its own weak legal system to carry out “hostage diplomacy,” combined with Meng’s exploitation of the procedural protections of the strong and independent Canadian and U.S. legal systems, may herald a new “asymmetric lawfare” strategy to counter the U.S. This strategy may prove an effective counter to the U.S. government’s efforts to use its own legal system to enforce economic sanctions, root out Chinese espionage, indict Chinese hackers, or otherwise counter the more assertive and threatening Chinese government.

I remain uncertain that this baseline premise, which undergirds the rest of his argument, holds true. In particular, his angle of analysis seems to set to the side, or not fully engage with, the following:

  1. China’s hostage taking has further weakened the trust that foreign companies will have in the Chinese government. They must now acknowledge, and build into their risk models, the possibility that their executives or employees could be seized should the Chinese government get into a diplomatic, political, or economic dispute with the country from which they operate.
  2. China’s blatant hostage taking impairs its world standing and has led to significant parts of the world shifting their attitudes towards the Chinese government. The results of these shifts are yet to be fully seen, but to date there have been doubts about entering into trade agreements with China, an increased solidarity amongst middle powers to resist what is seen as bad behaviour by China, and a push away from China and into the embrace of liberal democratic governments. This last point, in particular, runs counter to China’s long-term efforts to showcase its own style of governance as a genuine alternative to American and European models of democracy.
  3. Despite what has been written, I think that relying on hostage diplomacy associated with its weak rule of law showcases China’s comparatively weak hand. Relying on low rule of law to undertake lawfare endangers its international strategic interests, which rely on building international markets and being treated as a respectable and reputable partner on the world stage. Resorting to kidnapping impairs the government’s ability to demonstrate compliance with international agreements and fora so as to build out its international policies.

Of course, none of the above discounts the fact that the Chinese government did, in fact, exploit this ‘law asymmetry’ between its laws and those of high rule of law countries. And the Canadian government did act under duress as a result of their nationals having been taken hostage, including becoming a quiet advocate for Chinese interests insofar as Canadian diplomats sought a way for the US government to reach a compromise with Huawei/Meng so that Canada’s nationals could be returned home. And certainly the focus on relying on high rule of law systems can delay investigations into espionage or other illicit foreign activities and operations that are launched by the Chinese government. Nevertheless, neither the Canadian or American legal systems actually buckled under the foreign and domestic pressure to set aside the rule of law in favour of quick political ‘fixes.’

While there will almost certainly be many years of critique in Canada and the United States about how this whole affair was managed the fact will remain that both countries demonstrated that their justice systems would remain independent from the political matters of the day. And they did so despite tremendous pressure: from Trump, during his time as the president, and despite the Canadian government being subjected to considerable pressure campaigns by numerous former government officials who were supportive, for one reason or another, of the Chinese government’s position to return Huawei’s CFO.

While it remains to be written what the actual, ultimate, effect of this swap of Huawei’s CFO for two inappropriately detained Canadians will be, some lasting legacies may include diminished political capital for the Chinese government while, at the same time, a reinforcing of the trust that can be put in the American and Canadian (and, by extension, Western democratic) systems of justice. Should these legacies hold then China’s gambit will almost certainly prove to have backfired.

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When the Government Decides to Waylay Parliament

Steven Chaplin has a really great explanation of whether the Canadian government can rely on national security and evidentiary laws to lawfully justify refusing to provide documents to the House of Commons, and to House committees. His analysis and explanation arose as a result of the Canadian government doing everything it could to, first, refuse to provide documents to the Parliamentary Committee which was studying Canadian-Chinese relations and, subsequently, refusing to provide the documents when compelled to do so by the House of Commons itself.

Rather than releasing the requested documents the government turned to the courts to adjudicate whether the documents in question–which were asserted to contain sensitive national security information–must, in fact, be released to the House or whether they could instead be sent to an executive committee, filled with Members of Parliament and Senators, to assess the contents instead. As Chaplin notes,

Having the courts intervene, as proposed by the government’s application in the Federal Court, is not an option. The application is clearly precluded by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, 1689, which provides that a proceeding in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in court. Article 9 not only allows for free speech; it is also a constitutional limit on the jurisdiction of the courts to preclude judicial interference in the business of the House.

The House ordered that the documents be tabled without redaction. Any decision of the court that found to the contrary would impeach or question the proceeding that led to the Order. And any attempt by the courts to balance the interests involved would constitute the courts becoming involved in ascertaining, and thereby questioning, the needs of the House and why the House wants the documents.

Beyond the Court’s involvement impeding into the territory of Parliament, there could be serious and long-term implications of letting the court become a space wherein the government and the House fight to obtain information that has been demanded. Specifically,

It may be that at the end of the day the government will continue to refuse to produce documents. In the same way that the government cannot use the courts to withhold documents, the House cannot go to court to compel the government to produce them, or to order witnesses to attend proceedings. It could also invite disobedience of witnesses, requiring the House to either drop inquiries or involve the courts to compel attendance or evidence. Allowing, or requiring, the government and the House to resolve their differences in the courts would not only be contrary to the constitutional principles of Article 9, but “would inevitably create delays, disruption, uncertainties and costs which would hold up the nation’s business and on that account would be unacceptable even if, in the end, the Speaker’s rulings were vindicated as entirely proper” (Canada (House of Commons) v. Vaid [2005]). In short, the courts have no business intervening one way or the other.

Throughout the discussions that have taken place about this issue in Canada, what has been most striking is that the national security commentators and elites have envisioned that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) could (and should) be tasked to resolve any and all particularly sensitive national security issues that might be of interest to Parliament. None, however, seems to have contemplated that Parliament, itself, might take issue with the government trying to exclude Parliament from engaging in assessments of the government’s national security decisions nor that issue would be taken when topics of interest to Parliamentarians were punted into an executive body, wherein their fellow Members of Parliament on the body were sworn to the strictest secrecy. Instead, elites have hand waved to the importance of preserving secrecy in order for Canada to receive intelligence from allies, as well as asserted that the government would never mislead Parliament on national security matters (about which, these same experts explain, Members of Parliament are not prepared to receive, process, or understand given the sophistication of the intelligence and the apparent simplicity of most Parliamentarians themselves).

This was the topic of a recent episode of the Intrepid Podcast, where Philippe Lagassé noted that the exclusion of parliamentary experts when creating NSICOP meant that these entirely predictable showdown situations were functionally baked into how the executive body was composed. As someone who raised the issue of adopting an executive, versus a standing House, committee and was rebuffed as being ignorant of the reality of national security it’s with more than a little satisfaction that the very concerns which were raised when NSICOP was being created are, in fact, arising on the political agenda.

With regard to the documents that the House Committee was seeking, I don’t know or particularly care what their contents include. From my own experience I’m all too well aware that ‘national security’ is often stamped on things that either governments want to keep from the public because they can be politically damaging, be kept from the public just generally because of a culture of non-transparency and refusal of accountability, as well as (less often) be kept from the public on the basis that there are bonafide national security interests at stake. I do, however, care that the Government of Canada has (again) acted counter to Parliament’s wishes and has deliberately worked to impede the House from doing its work.

Successive governments seem to genuinely believe that they get to ‘rule’ Canada absolutely and with little accountability. While this is, in function, largely true given how cowed Members of Parliament are to their party leaders it’s incredibly serious and depressing to see the government further erode Parliament’s powers and abilities to fulfil its duties. A healthy democracy is filled with bumps for the government as it is held to account but, sadly, the Government of Canada–regardless of the party in power–is incredibly active in keeping itself, and its behaviours, from the public eye and thus held to account.

If only a committee might be struck to solve this problem…

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Operation Fox Hunt

(Photo by Erik Mclean on Pexels.com)

ProPublica’s Sebastian Rotella and Kirsten Berg have an outstanding piece on the Chinese government’s efforts to compel individuals to return to China to face often trumped up charges. Efforts include secretly sending Chinese officials into the United States to surveil, harass, intimidate, and stalk residents of the United States, and also imprisoning or otherwise threatening residents’ family member who have remained in China.

Many of the details in the article are the result of court records, interviews, and assessments of Chinese media. It remains to be seen whether Chinese agents’ abilities to conduct ‘fox hunts’ will be impeded now that the US government is more aware of these operations. Given the attention and suspicion now cast towards citizens of China, however, there is also a risk that FBI agents may become overzealous in their investigations to the detriment of law-abiding Chinese-Americans or visitors from China.

In an ideal world there would be equivalent analyses or publications on the extent to which these operations are also undertaken in Canada. To date, however, there is no equivalent to ProPublica’s piece in the Canadian media landscape and given the Canadian media’s contraction we can’t realistically expect anything, anytime soon. However, even a short piece which assessed whether individuals from China who’ve run operations in the United States, and who are now barred from entering the US or would face charges upon crossing the US border, are similarly barred or under an extradition order in Canada would be a positive addition to what we know of how the Canadian government is responding to these kinds of Chinese operations.

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Standards as the Contemporary Highway System

Jonathan Zittrain, in remarks prepared a few weeks ago, framed Internet protocol standards in a novel way. Specifically, he stated:

Second, it’s entirely fitting for a government to actively subsidize public goods like a common defense, a highway system, and, throughout the Internet’s evolution, the public interest development of standards and protocols to interlink otherwise-disparate systems. These subsidies for the development of Internet protocols, often expressed as grants to individual networking researchers at universities by such organizations as the National Science Foundation, were absolutely instrumental in the coalescence of Internet standards and the leasing of wholesale commercial networks on which to test them. (They also inspired some legislators to advertise their own foresight in having facilitated such strategic funding.) Alongside other basic science research support, this was perhaps some of the best bang for the buck that the American taxpayer has received in the history of the country. Government support in the tens of millions over a course of decades resulted in a flourishing of a networked economy measured in trillions.

Zittrain’s framing of this issue builds on some writing I’ve published around standards. In the executive summary of a report I wrote a few months ago, I stated that,

… the Government of Canada could more prominently engage with standards bodies to, at least in part, guarantee that such standards have security principles baked in and enabled by default; such efforts could include allocating tax relief to corporations, as well as funding to non-governmental organizations or charities, so that Canadians and Canadian interests are more deeply embedded in standards development processes.

To date I haven’t heard of this position being adopted by the Government of Canada, or even debated in public. However, framing this as a new kind of roadway could be the kind of rhetorical framing that would help it gain traction.

The Kaseya Ransomware Attack Is a Really Big Deal

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(Managed Service Provider image by the Canadian Centre for Cybersecurity)

Matt Tait, as normal, has good insights into just why the Kaseya ransomware attack1 was such a big deal:

In short, software supply chain security breaches don’t look like other categories of breaches. A lot of this comes down to the central conundrum of system security: it’s not possible to defend the edges of a system without centralization so that we can pool defensive resources. But this same centralization concentrates offensive action against a few single points of failure that, if breached, cause all of the edges to fall at once. And the more edges that central failure point controls, the more likely the collateral real-world consequences of any breach, but especially a ransomware breach will be catastrophic, and cause overwhelm the defensive cybersecurity industry’s ability to respond.

Managed Service Providers (MSPs) are becoming increasingly common targets. It’s worth noting that the Canadian Centre for Cybersecurity‘s National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020 listed ransomware as well as the exploitation of MSPs as two of the seven key threats to Canadian financial and economic health. The Centre went so far as to state that it expected,

… that over the next two years ransomware campaigns will very likely increasingly target MSPs for the purpose of targeting their clients as a means of scaling targeted ransomware campaigns.

Sadly, if not surprisingly, this assessment has been entirely correct. It remains to be seen what impact the 2020 threats assessment has, or will have, on Canadian organizations and their security postures. Based on conversations I’ve had over the past few months the results are not inspiring and the threat assessment has generally been less effective than hoped in driving change in Canada.

As discussed by Steven Bellovin, part of the broader challenge for the security community in preparing for MSP operations has been that defenders are routinely behind the times; operators modify what and who their campaigns will target and defenders are forced to scramble to catch up. He specifically, and depressingly, recognizes that, “…when it comes to target selection, the attackers have outmaneuvered defenders for almost 30 years.”

These failures are that much more noteworthy given that the United States has trumpeted for years that the NSA will ‘defend forward‘ to identify and hunt threats, and respond to them before they reach ‘American cybershores’.2 The seemingly now routine targeting of both system update mechanisms as well as vendors which provide security or operational controls for wide swathes of organizations demonstrates that things are going to get a lot worse before they’re likely to improve.

A course correction could follow from Western nations developing effective and meaningful cyber-deterrence processes that encourage nations such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea to punish computer operators who are behind some of the worst kinds of operations that have emerged in public view. However, this would in part require the American government (and its allies) to actually figure out how they can deter adversaries. It’s been 12 years or so, and counting, and it’s not apparent that any American administration has figured out how to implement a deterrence regime that exceeds issuing toothless threats. The same goes for most of their allies.

Absent an actual deterrence response, such as one which takes action in sovereign states that host malicious operators, Western nations have slowly joined together to issue group attributions of foreign operations. They’ve also come together to recognize certain classes of cyber operations as particularly problematic, including ransomware. Must nations build this shared capacity, first, before they can actually undertake deterrence activities? Should that be the case then it would strongly underscore the need to develop shared norms in advance of sovereign states exercising their latent capacities in cyber and other domains and lend credence to the importance of the Tallinn manual process . If, however, this capacity is built and nothing is still undertaken to deter, then what will the capacity actually be worth? While this is a fascinating scholarly exercise–it’s basically an opportunity to test competing scholarly hypotheses–it’s one that has significant real-world consequences and the danger is that once we recognize which hypothesis is correct, years of time and effort could have been wasted for little apparent gain.

What’s worse is that this even is a scholarly exercise. Given that more than a decade has passed, and that ‘cyber’ is not truly new anymore, why must hypotheses be spun instead of states having developed sufficient capacity to deter? Where are Western states’ muscles after so much time working this problem?


  1. As a point of order, when is an act of ransomware an attack versus an operation? ↩︎
  2. I just made that one up. No, I’m not proud of it. ↩︎

Vaccination, Discrimination, and Canadian Civil Liberties

Photo by Karolina Grabowska on Pexels.com

Civil liberties debates about whether individuals should have to get vaccinated against Covid-19 are on the rise. Civil liberties groups broadly worry that individuals will suffer intrusions into their privacy, or that rights of association or other rights will be unduly abridged, as businesses and employers require individuals to demonstrate proof of vaccination.

As discussed in a recent article published by the CBC, some individuals are specifically unable to, or concerned about, receiving Covid-19 vaccines on the basis that, “they’re taking immunosuppressant drugs, for example, while others have legitimate concerns about the safety and efficacy of the COVID-19 vaccines or justifiable fears borne from previous negative interactions with the health-care system.” The same expert, Arthur Schafer of the Centre for Professional and Applied Ethics at the University of Manitoba, said, “[w]e should try to accommodate people who have objections, conscientious or scientific or even religious, where we can do so without compromising public safety and without incurring a disproportionate cost to society.”

Other experts, such as Ann Cavoukian, worry that being compelled to disclose vaccination status could jeopardize individuals’ medical information should it be shared with parties who are not equipped to protect it, or who may combine it with other information to discriminate against individuals. For the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, they have taken the stance that individuals should have the freedom to choose to be vaccinated or not, that no compulsions should be applied to encourage vaccination (e.g., requiring vaccination to attend events), and broadly that, “COVID is just another risk now that we have to incorporate into our daily lives.”

In situations where individuals are unable to be vaccinated, either due to potential allergic responses or lack of availability of vaccine (e.g., those under the age of 12), then it is imperative to ensure that individuals do not face discrimination. In these situations, those affected cannot receive a vaccine and it is important to not create castes of the vaccinated and unable-to-be-vaccinated. For individuals who are hesitant due to historical negative experiences with vaccination efforts, or medical experimentation, some accommodations may also be required.

However, in the cases where vaccines are available and there are opportunities to receive said vaccine, then not getting vaccinated does constitute a choice. As it stands, today, in many Canadian schools children are required to received a set of vaccinations in order to attend school and if their parents refuse, then the children are required to use alternate educational systems (e.g., home schooling). When parents make a specific choice they are compelled to deal with the consequences of said decision. (Of course, there is not a vaccine for individuals under 12 years of age at the moment and so we shouldn’t be barring unvaccinated children from schools, but adopting such a requirement in the future might align with how schools regularly require proof of vaccination status to attend public schools.)

The ability to attend a concert, as an example, can and should be predicated on vaccination status where vaccination is an option for attendees. Similarly, if an individual refuses to be vaccinated their decision may have consequences in cases where they are required to be in-person in their workplace. There may be good reasons for why some workers decline to be vaccinated, such as a lack of paid days off and fear that losing a few days of work due to vaccination symptoms may prevent them from paying the rent or getting food; in such cases, accommodations to enable them to get vaccinated are needed. However, once such accommodations are made decisions to continue to not get vaccinated may have consequences.

In assessing whether policies are discriminatory individuals’ liberties as well as those of the broader population must be taken into account, with deliberate efforts made to ensure that group rights do not trample on the rights of minority or disenfranchised members of society. Accommodations must be made so that everyone can get vaccinated; rules cannot be established that apply equally but affect members of society in discriminatory ways. But, at the same time, the protection of rights is conditional and mitigating the spread of a particularly virulent disease that has serious health and economic effects is arguably one of those cases where protecting the community (and, by extension, those individuals who are unable to receive a vaccine for medical reasons) is of heightened importance.

Is this to say that there are no civil liberties concerns that might arise when vaccinating a population? No, obviously not.

In situations where individuals are unhoused or otherwise challenged in keeping or retaining a certification that they have been vaccinated, then it is important to build policies that do not discriminate against these classes of individuals. Similarly, if there is a concern that vaccination passes might present novel security risks that have correlate rights concerns (e.g., a digital system that links presentations of a vaccination credential with locational information) then it is important to carefully assess, critique, and re-develop systems so that they provide the minimum data required to reduce the risk of Covid-19’s spread. Also, as the population of vaccinated persons reaches certain percentages there may simply be less of a need to assess or check that someone is vaccinated. While this means that some ‘free riders’ will succeed, insofar as they will decline to be vaccinated and not suffer any direct consequences, the goal is not to punish people who refuse vaccination and instead to very strongly encourage enough people to get vaccinated so that the population as a whole is well-protected.

However, taking a position that Covid-19 is part of society and that society just has to get used to people refusing to be vaccinated while participating in ‘regular’ social life, and that this is just a cost of enjoying civil liberties, seems like a bad argument and a poor framing of the issue. Making this kind of broader argument risks pushing the majority of Canadians towards discounting all reasons that individuals may present to justify or explain not getting vaccinated, with the effect of inhibiting civil society from getting the public on board to protect the rights of those who would be harmfully affected by mandatory vaccination policies or demands that individuals always carry vaccine passport documents.

Those who have made a choice to opt-out of vaccination may experience resulting social costs, but those who cannot opt to get a vaccine in the first place or who have proven good reasons for avoiding vaccination shouldn’t be unduly disadvantaged. That’s the line in the sand to hold and defend, not that protecting civil liberties means that there should be no cost for voluntarily opting out of life saving vaccination programs.

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Does Canada, Really, Need A Foreign Intelligence Service?

A group of former senior Canadian government officials who have been heavily involved in the intelligence community recently penned an op-ed that raised the question of “does Canada need a foreign intelligence service?” It’s a curious piece, insofar as it argues that Canada does need such a service while simultaneously discounting some of the past debates about whether this kind of a service should be established, as well as giving short shrift to Canada’s existing collection capacities that are little spoken about. They also fundamentally fail to take up what is probably the most serious issue currently plaguing Canada’s intelligence community, which is the inability to identify, hire, and retain qualified staff in existing agencies that have intelligence collection and analysis responsibilities.

The Argument

The authors’ argument proceeds in a few pieces. First, it argues that Canadian decision makers don’t really possess an intelligence mindset insofar as they’re not primed to want or feel the need to use foreign intelligence collected from human sources. Second, they argue that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) really does already possess a limited foreign intelligence mandate (and, thus, that the Government of Canada would only be enhancing pre-existing powers instead of create new powers from nothing). Third, and the meat of the article, they suggest that Canada probably does want an agency that collects foreign intelligence using human sources to support other members of the intelligence community (e.g., the Communications Security Establishment) and likely that such powers could just be injected into CSIS itself. The article concludes with the position that Canada’s allies “have quietly grumbled from time to time that Canada is not pulling its weight” and that we can’t prioritize our own collection needs when we’re being given intelligence from our close allies per agreements we’ve established with them. This last part of the argument has a nationalistic bent to it: implicitly they’re asking whether we can really trust even our allies and closest friends? Don’t we need to create a capacity and determine where such an agency and its tasking should focus on, perhaps starting small but with the intent of it getting larger?

Past Debates and Existing Authorities

The argument as positioned fails to clearly make the case for why these expanded authorities are required and simultaneously does not account for the existing powers associated with the CSE, the Canadian military, and Global Affairs Canada.

With regards to the former, the authors state, “the arguments for and against the establishment of a new agency have never really been examined; they have only been cursorily debated from time to time within the government by different agencies, usually arguing on the basis of their own interests.” In making this argument they depend on people not remembering their history. The creation of CSIS saw a significant debate about whether to include foreign human intelligence elements and the decision by Parliamentarians–not just the executive–was to not include these elements. The question of whether to enable CSIS or another agency to collect foreign human intelligence cropped up, again, in the late 1990s and early 2000, and again around 2006-2008 or so when the Harper government proposed setting up this kind of an agency and then declined to do so. To some extent, the authors’ op-ed is keeping with the tradition of this question arising every decade or so before being quietly set to the side.

In terms of agencies’ existing authorities and capacities, the CSE is responsible for conducting signals intelligence for the Canadian government and is tasked to focus on particular kinds of information per priorities that are established by the government. Per its authorizing legislation, the CSE can also undertake certain kinds of covert operations, the details of which have been kept firmly under wraps. The Canadian military has been aggressively building up its intelligence capacities with few details leaking out, and its ability to undertake foreign intelligence using human sources as unclear as the breadth of its mandate more generally.1 Finally, GAC has long collected information abroad. While their activities are divergent from the CIA or MI6–officials at GAC aren’t planning assassinations, as an example–they do collect foreign intelligence and share it back with the rest of the Government of Canada. Further, in their increasingly distant past they stepped in for the CIA in environments the Agency was prevented from operating within, such as in Cuba.

All of this is to say that Canada periodically goes through these debates of whether it should stand up a foreign intelligence service akin to the CIA or MI6. But the benefits of such a service are often unclear, the costs prohibitive, and the actual debates about what Canada already does left by the wayside. Before anyone seriously thinks about establishing a new service, they’d be well advised to read through Carvin’s, Juneau’s, and Forcese’s book Top Secret Canada. After doing so, readers will appreciate that staffing is already a core problem facing the Canadian intelligence community and recognize that creating yet another agency will only worsen this problem. Indeed, before focusing on creating new agencies the authors of the Globe and Mail op-ed might turn their minds to how to overcome the existing staffing problems. Solving that problem might enable agencies to best use their existing authorizing legislation and mandates to get much of the human foreign intelligence that the authors are so concerned about collecting. Maybe that op-ed could be titled, “Does Canada’s Intelligence Community Really Have a Staffing Problem?”


  1. As an example of the questionable breadth of the Canadian military’s intelligence function, when the military was tasked with assisting long-term care home during the height of the Covid-19 pandemic in Canada, they undertook surveillance of domestic activism organizations for unclear reasons and subsequently shared the end-products with the Ontario government. ↩︎
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We have come a long way in routing the taboos that stand in the way of justice for victims of sexual assault. But there is still a distance to go. The problems are complex and rooted in centuries of culture and myth. The law, imperfect as it may be, is a powerful tool in achieving lasting change. But real justice will come only when we change attitudes—when respect for the autonomy of every person replaces old myths grounded in ownership, control, and power.

– Beverly McLachlin, Truth Be Told: My Journey Through Life and the Law