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Naqvi: Solution to Court Delays – Call off your Crowns

There can be no debate — delays in our justice system are a very bad thing. With every week, month and year of delay, memories fade, the quality of evidence degrades and victims are denied legal closure.

And, often intentionally overlooked is the reality that court delays mean that accused persons who are presumed (and often are) innocent suffer ongoing stigma, stress, loss of employment, oppressive bail conditions and incarceration waiting for their trial dates.

Let’s get one thing straight — there is not one accused person being held in our Dicken-sian provincial jails who is intentionally delaying their day in court. There is simply no benefit to do so. Ontario’s remand centres are violent, overcrowded, humanity-destroying hellscapes, which are completely devoid of any rehabilitation programming or basic human comforts.

Canadians only realize how broken the legal system is when they, or someone they know, is sucked into it.

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Privacy and Policing in a Digital World

As the federal government holds public consultations on what changes should be made to Bill C-51, the controversial anti-terrorism legislation passed by the Conservative government, various police agencies such as the RCMP and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police have petitioned to gain new powers to access telephone and internet data. Meanwhile nearly half of Canadians believe they should have the right to complete digital privacy. The Agenda examines the question of how to balance privacy rights with effective policing in the digital realm.

I was part of a panel that discussed some of the powers that the Government of Canada is opening for discussion as part of its National Security consultation, which ends on December 15, 2016. If you want to provide comments to the government, see: https://www.canada.ca/en/services/defence/nationalsecurity/consultation-national-security.html

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RCMP is overstating Canada’s ‘surveillance lag’ | Toronto Star

From a piece that I wrote with Tamir Israel for the Toronto Star:

The RCMP has been lobbying the government behind the scenes for increased surveillance powers on the faulty premise that their investigative powers are lagging behind those foreign police services.

The centrepiece of the RCMP’s pitch is captured in an infographic that purports to show foreign governments are legislating powers that are more responsive to investigative challenges posed by the digital world. On the basis of this comparison, the RCMP appears to have convinced the federal government to transform a process intended to curb the excesses of Bill C-51 into one dominated by proposals for additional surveillance powers.

The RCMP’s lobbying effort misleadingly leaves an impression that Canadian law enforcement efforts are being confounded by digital activities.

An Op-ed that I published with a colleague of mine, Tamir Israel, earlier this week that calls out the RCMP for deliberately misleading the public with regards to government agencies’ existing surveillance powers and capabilities.

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Pleading the Case: How the RCMP Fails to Justify Calls for New Investigatory Powers

The powers that the government is proposing in its national security consultation — that all communications made by all Canadians be retained regardless of guilt, that all communications be accessible to state agencies on the basis that any Canadian could potentially commit a crime, that security of communications infrastructure should be secondary to government access to communications — are deeply disproportionate to the challenges government agencies are facing. The cases chosen by authorities to be selectively revealed to journalists do not reveal a crisis of policing but that authorities continue to face the ever-present challenges of how to prioritize cases, how to assign resources, and how to pursue investigations to conclusion. Authorities have never had a perfect view into the private lives of citizens and that is likely to continue to be the case, but they presently have a far better view into the lives of most citizens, using existing powers, than ever before in history.

The powers discussed in its consultation, and that the RCMP has implicitly argued for by revealing these cases, presume that all communications in Canada ought to be accessible to government agencies upon their demand. Implementing the powers outlined in the national security consultation would require private businesses to assume significant costs in order to intercept and retain any Canadian’s communications. And such powers would threaten the security of all Canadians — by introducing backdoors into Canada’s communications ecosystem — in order to potentially collect evidence pursuant to a small number of cases, while simultaneously exposing all Canadians to the prospect of criminals or foreign governments exploiting the backdoors the RCMP is implicitly calling for.

While the government routinely frames lawful interception, mandated decryption, and other investigatory powers as principally a ‘privacy-vs-security’ debate, the debate can be framed as one of ‘security-or-less-security’. Do Canadians want to endanger their daily communications and become less secure in their routine activities so that the RCMP and our security services can better intercept data they cannot read, or retain information they cannot process? Or do Canadians want the strongest security possible so that their businesses, personal relationships, religious observations, and other aspects of their daily life are kept safe from third-persons who want to capture and exploit their sensitive and oftentimes confidential information? Do we want to be more safe from cybercriminals, or more likely to be victimized by them by providing powers to government agencies?

 

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Dissecting CSIS’ Statement Concerning Indefinite Metadata Retention

The Canada Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) released a public statement after the Federal Court found the Service to be breaking the law by permanently retaining metadata they had been collecting. To date, the Public Safety Minister has refused to clarify the numbers of Canadians who have been caught up in this ‘catch once, catch forever’ surveillance regime.

The Service’s statement is incredibly misleading. It is designed to trick Canadians and parliamentarians into thinking that CSIS didn’t do anything that was really ‘that’ bad. I fundamentally disagree with CSIS’ activities in this regard and, as a result, I’ve conducted a detailed evaluation of each sentence of the Service’s statement.

You can read my dissection of CSIS’ statement at Technology, Thoughts, and Trinkets.

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Canada’s spy agency illegally kept data for a decade, court rules

To be clear, the judge’s ruling:

  1. Found that CSIS had deliberately been misleading/lying to the court for a decade concerning the agency’s permanent retention of metadata;
  2. Raised the prospect of contempt of court proceedings against CSIS and its attorneys at the Department of Justice;
  3. Approved changes to unknown warrants (we’re not allowed, as members of the public, to know the warranting powers of CSIS it seems);
  4. Did not require CSIS to delete or stop using the metadata it had illegally collected, on grounds that doing so could raise jurisdictional issues. Translation: the information has been shared, or mixed with, foreign agencies’ metadata already and thus prevents the court from easily crafting a judgment around its use;
  5. CSIS did not believe that it was required to be fully transparent with the federal court that issues CSIS’ warrants on grounds that the court was ‘not an oversight body’;
  6. CSIS had internally, with Department of Justice guidance, secretly reinterpreted laws to cloak its actions in the guise of lawfulness (internally) while deliberately hiding such interpretations and the implications thereof from the court.

Canada has a national security consultation going on, and part of it raises the question of ‘does Canada have sufficient oversight and accountability for its national security operations?’ If you care about these issues, go and spend some time sending a message to the government.

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How Canada’s Anti-Cyberbullying Law Is Being Used to Spy on Journalists

From Motherboard:

According to Citizen Lab researcher Christopher Parsons, these same powers that target journalists can be used against non-journalists under C-13. And the only reason we know about the aforementioned cases is that the press has a platform to speak out.

“This is an area where transparency and accountability are essential,” Parsons said in an interview. “We’ve given piles and piles of new powers to law enforcement and security agencies alike. What’s happened to this journalist shows we desperately need to know how the government uses its powers to ensure they’re not abused in any way.”

“I expect that the use of these particular powers will become more common as the police get more used to using it and more savvy in using them,” Parsons said.

These were powers that were ultimately sold to the public (and passed into law) as needed to ‘child pornography’. And now they’re being used to snoop on journalists to figure out who their sources are, without being mandated to report on the regularity at which the powers are used to the efficacy of such uses. For some reason, this process doesn’t inspire a lot of confidence in me.