Tag: Cybersecurity

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Links Writing

The Ongoing Problems of Placing Backdoors in Telecommunications Networks

In a cyber incident reminiscent of Operation Aurora,1 threat actors successfully penetrated American telecommunications companies (and a small number of other countries’ service providers) to gain access to lawful interception systems or associated data. The result was that:

For months or longer, the hackers might have held access to network infrastructure used to cooperate with lawful U.S. requests for communications data, according to people familiar with the matter, which amounts to a major national security risk. The attackers also had access to other tranches of more generic internet traffic, they said.

…

The surveillance systems believed to be at issue are used to cooperate with requests for domestic information related to criminal and national security investigations. Under federal law, telecommunications and broadband companies must allow authorities to intercept electronic information pursuant to a court order. It couldn’t be determined if systems that support foreign intelligence surveillance were also vulnerable in the breach.

Not only is this a major intelligence coup for the adversary in question, but it once more reveals the fundamental difficulties in deliberately establishing lawful access/interception systems in communications infrastructures to support law enforcement and national security investigations while, simultaneously, preventing adversaries from taking advantage of the same deliberately-designed communications vulnerabilities.

  1. Or Greece’s 2004 Olympics wiretap scandal. ↩︎
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Writing

Computers-on-Wheels and Web-Based Vulnerabilities

While there can be significant efficiencies gained by increasing the amount of data that is accessible by motor vehicles, connecting these computers-on-wheels to the Internet can have notable consequences.

Recent reporting by Wired reveals, as an example, that:

… a group of independent security researchers revealed that they’d found a flaw in a web portal operated by the carmaker Kia that let the researchers reassign control of the internet-connected features of most modern Kia vehicles—dozens of models representing millions of cars on the road—from the smartphone of a car’s owner to the hackers’ own phone or computer. By exploiting that vulnerability and building their own custom app to send commands to target cars, they were able to scan virtually any internet-connected Kia vehicle’s license plate and within seconds gain the ability to track that car’s location, unlock the car, honk its horn, or start its ignition at will.

…

“If someone cut you off in traffic, you could scan their license plate and then know where they were whenever you wanted and break into their car,” says Curry. “If we hadn’t brought this to Kia’s attention, anybody who could query someone’s license plate could essentially stalk them.” For Kias that come installed with a 360-degree camera, that camera, too, was accessible to hackers. Beyond allowing the hijacking of connected features in cars themselves, Curry says, the web portal flaw also allowed hackers to query a broad range of personal information about Kia customers—names, email addresses, phone numbers, home addresses, and even past driving routes in some cases—a potentially massive data leak.

The nature of the vulnerability is particularly concerning:

When the researchers sent commands directly to the API of that website—the interface that allows users to interact with its underlying data—they say they found that there was nothing preventing them from accessing the privileges of a Kia dealer, such as assigning or reassigning control of the vehicles’ features to any customer account they created.

I do have to admit that I appreciate that this started with discovering issues with APIs used by scooters, which led the researchers to become “super interested in trying more ways to make more things honk.”

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Aside Writing

2024.6.27

For the past many months I’ve had the joy of working with, and learning from, a truly terrific set of colleagues. One of the files we’ve handled has been around law reform in Ontario and specifically Bill 194, the Strengthening Cyber Security and Building Trust in the Public Sector Act.

Our organization’s submission focuses on ways to further improve the legislation by way of offering 28 recommendations that apply to Schedule 1 (concerning cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and technologies affecting individuals under the age of 18) and Schedule 2 (amendments to FIPPA). Broadly, our recommendations concern the levels of accountability, transparency, and oversight that are needed in a rapidly changing world.

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Aside

2024.3.18

It is exceptionally rewarding to see years of research and advocacy while I was at my former employer lead to significant reforms to legislation The effect, thus far, has been to protect residents of Canada from cyber-related threats while, also, imposing checks on otherwise unfettered government power and simultaneously protecting all residents of Canada’s privacy.

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Links Writing

Near-Term Threats Posed by Emergent AI Technologies

A cyberpunk image of a series of hackers that represent the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s, and the 2050s.

In January, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) published its assessment of the near-term impact of AI with regards to cyber threats. The whole assessment is worth reading for its clarity and brevity in identifying different ways that AI technologies will be used by high-capacity state actors, by other state and well resourced criminal and mercenary actors, and by comparatively low-skill actors.

A few items which caught my eye:

  • More sophisticated uses of AI in cyber operations are highly likely to be restricted to threat actors with access to quality training data, significant expertise (in both AI and cyber), and resources. More advanced uses are unlikely to be realised before 2025.
  • AI will almost certainly make cyber operations more impactful because threat actors will be able to analyse exfiltrated data faster and more effectively, and use it to train AI models.
  • AI lowers the barrier for novice cyber criminals, hackers-for-hire and hacktivists to carry out effective access and information gathering operations. This enhanced access will likely contribute to the global ransomware threat over the next two years.
  • Cyber resilience challenges will become more acute as the technology develops. To 2025, GenAI and large language models will make it difficult for everyone, regardless of their level of cyber security understanding, to assess whether an email or password reset request is genuine, or to identify phishing, spoofing or social engineering attempts.

There are more insights, such as the value of training data held by high capacity actors and the likelihood that low skill actors will see significant upskilling over the next 18 months due to the availability of AI technologies.

The potential to assess information more quickly may have particularly notable impacts in the national security space, enable more effective corporate espionage operations, as well as enhance cyber criminal activities. In all cases, the ability to assess and query volumes of information at speed and scale will let threat actors extract value from information more efficiently than today.

The fact that the same technologies may enable lower-skilled actors to undertake wider ransomware operations, where it will be challenging to distinguish legitimate versus illegitimate security-related emails, also speaks to the desperate need for organizations to transition to higher-security solutions, including multiple factor authentication or passkeys.

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Links Writing

The Near-Term Impact of AI Technologies and Cyber Threats

In January, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) published its assessment of the near-term impact of AI with regards to cyber threats. The whole assessment is worth reading for its clarity and brevity in identifying different ways that AI technologies will be used by high-capacity state actors, by other state and well resourced criminal and mercenary actors, and by comparatively low-skill actors.

A few items which caught my eye:

  • More sophisticated uses of AI in cyber operations are highly likely to be restricted to threat actors with access to quality training data, significant expertise (in both AI and cyber), and resources. More advanced uses are unlikely to be realised before 2025.
  • AI will almost certainly make cyber operations more impactful because threat actors will be able to analyse exfiltrated data faster and more effectively, and use it to train AI models.
  • AI lowers the barrier for novice cyber criminals, hackers-for-hire and hacktivists to carry out effective access and information gathering operations. This enhanced access will likely contribute to the global ransomware threat over the next two years.
  • Cyber resilience challenges will become more acute as the technology develops. To 2025, GenAI and large language models will make it difficult for everyone, regardless of their level of cyber security understanding, to assess whether an email or password reset request is genuine, or to identify phishing, spoofing or social engineering attempts.

There are more insights, such as the value of training data held by high capacity actors and the likelihood that low skill actors will see significant upskilling over the next 18 months due to the availability of AI technologies.

The potential to assess information more quickly may have particularly notable impacts in the national security space, enable more effective corporate espionage operations, as well as enhance cyber criminal activities. In all cases, the ability to assess and query volumes of information at speed and scale will let threat actors extract value from information more efficiently than today.

The fact that the same technologies may enable lower-skilled actors to undertake wider ransomware operations, where it will be challenging to distinguish legitimate versus illegitimate security-related emails, also speaks to the desperate need for organizations to transition to higher-security solutions, including multiple factor authentication or passkeys.

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Links

Pulling Back the Curtain on the Appin Cyber Mercenary Organization

Curious about what “cyber mercenaries” do? How they operate and facilitate targeting?

This excellent long-form piece from Reuters exquisitely details the history of Appin, an Indian cyber mercenary outfit, and confirms and publicly reveals many of the operations that it has undertaken.

As an aside, the sourcing in this article is particularly impressive, which is to expected from Satter et al. They keep showing they’re amongst the best in the business!

Moreover, the sidenote concerning the NSA’s awareness of the company, and why, is notable in its own right. The authors write,

The National Security Agency (NSA), which spies on foreigners for the U.S. government, began surveilling the company after watching it hack “high value” Pakistani officials around 2009, one of the sources said. An NSA spokesperson declined to comment.

This showcases that Appin may either have been seen as a source of fourth-party collection (i.e. where an intelligence service takes the collection material, as another service is themselves collecting it from a target) or have endangered the NSA’s own collection or targeting activities, on the basis that Appin could provoke targets to assume heightened cybersecurity practices or otherwise cause them to behave in ways that interfered with the NSA’s own operations.

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Links

Russian Cyber Doctrine and Its Implementation

Photo by Mati Mango on Pexels.com

While the following might be a bit bellicose it, at the same time, has a ring of truth to it.

Using a foreign country’s military doctrine to reframe fuck-ups as successes — here, that the Russians’ real operations have had the intended effects — boils down to doing a GRU colonel’s work for him; placating Gerasimov about whether or not the O6’s department has contributed to winning the war, among other things.

The Russian government and its various agencies have been incredibly active in attempting to influence or affect the ability of the Ukrainian government to resist the illegal Russian invasion of its territory. But at the same time there has been a back and forth about the successes or failures of Russia in largely academic or public policy circles. In at least some cases, these arguments seem to argue for the successes of the Russian doctrine without sufficient evidence to maintain the position.

Notwithstanding the value of some of those debates it’s nice to see a line of critique that is more attentive to the structure of institutions and what often drives them, with the affect of broadening the rationales and explanations for the (un)successful efforts in the cyber domain by Russian forces.

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Links

Cybersecurity and White Labelled Android Devices

Trend Micro has a nice short piece on the challenges of assessing the security properties of various components of Android devices. In short, white labelling incentivizes device manufacturers to invest the least amount possible in what they’re building for the brands that will sell devices to consumers. Trend Micro included this very nice little mention on the shenanigans that firmware developers can get up to:

Firmware developers supplying the OEM might agree to provide the software at a lower cost because they can compensate the lost profit through questionable means, for example by discreetly pre-installing apps from other app developers for a fee. There is a whole market built around this bundling service with prices ranging from 1 to 10 Chinese yuan (approximately US$0.14 to US$1.37 as of this writing) per application per device. This is where the risk is: As long as the firmware, packaged apps, and update mechanisms of the device are not owned, controlled, or audited by the smartphone brand itself, a rogue supplier can hide unauthorized code therein.1

While the authors suggest a range of policy options, from SBOMs to placing requirements on device transparency before administrators ‘trust’ devices, I’m not confident of these suggestions’ efficacy when taking a broader look at who principally uses white labelled devices. There are economics at play: should all devices have increased input costs associated with greater traceability and accountability then it will place financial pressures on the individuals in society who are most likely to be purchasing these devices. I doubt that upper-middle class individuals will be particularly affected by restricting the availability of many white labelled Android devices but such restrictions would almost certainly have disproportionate impacts on less affluent members of society or those who are, by necessity, price conscious. Should these individuals have to pay more for the computing power that they may depend on for a wide range of tasks—and in excess of how more affluent members of society use their devices?

Security has long been a property that individuals with more money can more easily ‘acquire’, and those who are less affluent have been less able to possess similar quantities or qualities of security in the services and products that they own. I understand and appreciate (and want to agree with) the Trend Micro analysts on how to alleviate some of the worse security properties associated with white labelled devices but it seems as though any such calculation needs to undertake a broader intersectional analysis. It’s possible that at the conclusion of such an analysis you still arrive at similar security-related concerns but would, also, include a number of structural social change policy prescriptions as preconditions that must be met before heightened security can be made more equitably available to more members of society.

  1. Emphasis added. ↩︎
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Writing

Why Is(n’t) TikTok A National Security Risk?

Photo by Ron Lach on Pexels.com

There have been grumblings about TikTok being a national security risk for many years and they’re getting louder with each passing month. Indeed, in the United States a bill has been presented to ban TikTok (“The ANTI-SOCIAL CCP ACT“) and a separate bill (“No TikTok on Government Devices Act“) has passed the Senate and would bar the application from being used on government devices. In Canada, the Prime Minister noted that the country’s signals intelligence agency, the Communications Security Establishment, is “watching very carefully.”

I recently provided commentary where I outlined some of the potential risks associated with TikTok and where it likely should fit into Canada’s national security priorities (spoiler: probably pretty low). Here I just want to expand on my comments a bit to provide some deeper context and reflections.

As with all things security-related you need to think through what assets you are attempting to protect, the sensitivity of what you’re trying to protect, and what measures are more or less likely to protect those assets. Further, in developing a protection strategy you need to think through how many resources you’re willing to invest to achieve the sought-after protection. This applies as much to national security policy makers as it does to individuals trying to secure devices or networks.

What Is Being Protected

Most public figures who talk about TikTok and national security are presently focused on one or two assets.

First, they worry that a large volume of data may be collected and used by Chinese government agencies, after these agencies receive it either voluntarily from TikTok or after compelling its disclosure. Commentators argue that Chinese companies are bound to obey the national security laws of China and, as such, may be forced to disclose data without any notice to users or non-Chinese government agencies. This information could be used to obtain information about specific individuals or communities, inclusive of what people are searching on the platform (e.g., medical information, financial information, sexual preference information), what they are themselves posting and could be embarrassing, or metadata which could be used for subsequent targeting.

Second, commentators are adopting a somewhat odious language of ‘cognitive warfare’ in talking about TikTok.1 The argument is that the Chinese government might compel the company to modify its algorithms so as to influence what people are seeing on the platform. The intent of this modification would be to influence political preferences or social and cultural perceptions. Some worry this kind of influence could guide whom individuals are more likely to vote for (e.g., you see a number of videos that directly or indirectly encourage you to support particular political parties), cause generalised apathy (e.g., you see videos that suggest that all parties are bad and none worth voting for), or enhance societal tensions (e.g., work to inflame partisanship and impair the functioning of otherwise moderate democracies). Or, as likely, a combination of each of these kinds of influence operations. Moreover, the TikTok algorithm could be modified by government compulsion to prioritise videos that praise some countries or that suppress videos which negatively portray other countries.

What Is the Sensitivity of the Assets?

When we consider the sensitivity of the information and data which is collected by TikTok it can be potentially high but, in practice, possesses differing sensitivities based on the person(s) in question. Research conducted by the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab found that while TikTok does collect a significant volume of information, that volume largely parallels what Facebook or other Western companies collect. To put this slightly differently, a lot of information is collected and the sensitivity is associated with whom it belongs to, who may have access to it, and what those parties do with it.

When we consider who is using TikTok and having their information uploaded to the company’s servers, then, the question becomes whether there is a particular national security risk linked with this activity. While some individuals may potentially be targets based on their political, business, or civil society bonafides this will not be the case with all (or most) users. However, in even assessing the national security risks linked to individuals (or associated groups) it’s helpful to do a little more thinking.

First, the amount of information that is collected by TikTok, when merged with other data which could theoretically be collected using other signals intelligence methods (e.g., extracting metadata and select content from middle-boxes, Internet platforms, open-source locations, etc) could be very revealing. Five Eyes countries (i.e., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America) collect large volumes of metadata on vast swathes of the world’s populations in order to develop patterns of life which, when added together, can be deeply revelatory. When and how those countries’ intelligence agencies actually use the collected information varies and is kept very secretive. Generally, however, only a small subset of individuals whose information is collected and retained for any period of time have actions taken towards them. Nonetheless, we know that there is a genuine concern about information from private companies being obtained by intelligence services in the Five Eyes and it’s reasonable to be concerned that similar activities might be undertaken by Chinese intelligence services.

Second, the kinds of content information which are retained by TikTok could be embarrassing at a future time, or used by state agencies in ways that users would not expect or prefer. Imagine a situation where a young person says or does something on TikTok which is deeply offensive. Fast forward 3-4 years and their parents are diplomats or significant members of the business community, and that offensive content is used by Chinese security services to embarrass or otherwise inconvenience the parents. Such influence operations might impede Canada’s ability to conduct its diplomacy abroad or undermine the a business’s ability to prosper.

Third, the TikTok algorithm is not well understood. There is a risk that the Chinese government might compel ByteDance, and through them the TikTok platform, to modify algorithms to amplify some content and not others. It is hard to assess how ‘sensitive’ a population’s general sense of the world is but, broadly, if a surreptitious foreign influence operation occurred it might potentially affect how a population behaves or sees the world. To be clear this kind of shift in behaviour would not follow from a single video but from a concerted effort over time that shifted social perceptions amongst at least some distinct social communities. The sensitivity of the information used to identify videos to play, then, could be quite high across a substantial swathe of the population using the platform.

It’s important to recognise that in the aforementioned examples there is no evidence that ByteDance, which owns TikTok, has been compelled by the Chinese government to perform these activities. But these are the kinds of sensitivities that are linked to using TikTok and are popularly discussed.

What Should Be Done To Protect Assets?

The threats which are posed by TikTok are, at the moment, specious: it could be used for any number of things. Why people are concerned are linked less to the algorithm or data that is collected but, instead, to ByteDance being a Chinese company that might be influenced by the Chinese government to share data or undertake activities which are deleterious to Western countries’ interests.

Bluntly: the issue raised by TikTok is not necessarily linked to the platform itself but to the geopolitical struggles between China and other advanced economies throughout the world. We don’t have a TikTok problem per se but, instead, have a Chinese national security and foreign policy problem. TikTok is just a very narrow lens through which concerns and fears are being channelled.

So in the absence of obvious and deliberate harmful activities being undertaken by ByteDance and TikTok at the behest of the Chinese government what should be done? At the outset it’s worth recognising that many of the concerns expressed by politicians–and especially those linked to surreptitious influence operations–would already run afoul of Canadian law. The CSIS Act bars clandestine foreign intelligence operations which are regarded as threatening the security of Canada. Specifically, threats to the security of Canada means:

(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage,

(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person,

(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state, and

(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada,

CSIS is authorised to undertake measures which would reduce the threats to the security of Canada, perhaps in partnership with the Communications Security Establishment, should such a threat be identified and a warrant obtained from the federal court.

On the whole a general ban on TikTok is almost certainly disproportionate and unreasonable at this point in time. There is no evidence of harm. There is no evidence of influence by the Chinese government. Rather than banning the platform generally I think that more focused legislation or policy could make sense.

First, I think that legislation or (preferably) policies precluding at least some members of government and senior civil servants from using TikTok has some merit. In these cases a risk analysis should be conducted to determine if collected information would undermine the Government of Canada’s ability to secure confidential information or if the collected information could be used for intelligence operations against the government officials. Advice might, also, be issued by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service so that private organisations are aware of their risks. In exceptional situations some kind of security requirements might also be imposed on private organisations and individuals, such as those who are involved in especially sensitive roles managing critical infrastructure systems. Ultimately, I suspect the number of people who should fall under this ban would, and should, be pretty small.

Second, what makes sense is legislation that requires social media companies writ large–not just TikTok–to make their algorithms and data flows legible to regulators. Moreover, individual users should be able to learn, and understand, why certain content is being prioritised or shown to them. Should platforms decline to comply with such a the law then sanctions may be merited. Similarly, should algorithmic legibility showcase that platforms are being manipulated or developed in ways that deliberately undermine social cohesion then some sanctions might be merited, though with the caveat that “social cohesion” should be understood as referring to platforms being deliberately designed to incite rage or other strong emotions with the effect of continually, and artificially, weakening social cohesion and amplifying social cleavages. The term should not, however, be seen as a kind of code for creating exclusionary social environments where underprivileged groups continue to be treated in discriminatory ways.

So Is TikTok ‘Dangerous’ From A National Security Perspective?

Based on open source information2 there is no reason to think that TikTok is currently a national security threat. Are there any risks associated with the platform? Sure, but they need to be juxtaposed against equivalent or more serious threats and priorities. We only have so many resources to direct towards the growing legion of legitimate national security risks and issues; funnelling a limited set of resources towards TikTok may not be the best kind of prioritisation.

Consider that while the Chinese government could compel TikTok to disclose information about its users to intelligence and security services…the same government could also use business cutouts and purchase much of the same information from data brokers operating in the United States and other jurisdictions. There would be no need to secretly force a company to do something when, instead, it could just lawfully acquire equivalent (or more extensive!) information. This is a pressing and real national security (and privacy!) issue and is deserving of legislative scrutiny and attention.

Further, while there is a risk that TikTok could be used to manipulate social values…the same is true of other social networking services. Indeed, academic and journalistic research over the past 5-7 years has drawn attention to how popular social media services are designed to deliver dopamine hits and keep us on them. We know that various private companies and public organisations around the world work tirelessly to ‘hack’ those algorithms and manipulate social values. Of course this broader manipulation doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t care but, also, makes clear that TikTok isn’t the sole vector of these efforts. Moreover, there are real questions about the how well social influence campaigns work: do they influence behaviour–are they supplying change?–or is the efficaciousness of any campaign representative of an attentive and interested pre-existing audience–is demand for the content the problem?

The nice thing about banning, blocking, or censoring material, or undertaking some other kind of binary decision, is that you feel like you’ve done something. Bans, blocks, and censors are typically designed for a black and white world. We, however, live in a world that is actually shrouded in greys. We only have so much legislative time, so much policy capacity, so much enforcement ability: it should all be directed efficiently to understanding, appreciating, and addressing the fulness of the challenges facing states and society. This time and effort should not be spent on performative politics that is great for providing a dopamine hit but which fails to address the real underlying issues.

  1. I have previously talked about the broader risks of correlating national security and information security. ↩︎
  2. Open source information means information which you or I can find, and read, without requiring a security clearance. ↩︎