Tag: Cybersecurity

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Links Writing

Encryption Use Hits a New Height in Canada

In a continuing demonstration of the importance of strong and privacy-protective communications, the federal Foreign Interference Commission has created a Signal account to receive confidential information.

Encrypted Messaging
For those who may feel more comfortable providing information to the Commission using encrypted means, they may do so through the Signal – Private Messenger app. Those who already have a Signal account can contact the Commission using our username below. Others will have to first download the app and set up an account before they can communicate with the Commission.

The Commission’s Signal Username is signal_pifi_epie20.24

Signal users can also scan QR Code below for the Commission’s username:

The Commission has put strict measures in place to protect the confidentiality of any information provided through this Signal account.

Not so long ago, the Government of Canada was arguing for an irresponsible encryption policy that included the ability to backdoor end-to-end encryption. It’s hard to overstate the significance of a government body now explicitly adopting Signal.

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Links Writing

The Ongoing Problems of Placing Backdoors in Telecommunications Networks

In a cyber incident reminiscent of Operation Aurora,1 threat actors successfully penetrated American telecommunications companies (and a small number of other countries’ service providers) to gain access to lawful interception systems or associated data. The result was that:

For months or longer, the hackers might have held access to network infrastructure used to cooperate with lawful U.S. requests for communications data, according to people familiar with the matter, which amounts to a major national security risk. The attackers also had access to other tranches of more generic internet traffic, they said.

…

The surveillance systems believed to be at issue are used to cooperate with requests for domestic information related to criminal and national security investigations. Under federal law, telecommunications and broadband companies must allow authorities to intercept electronic information pursuant to a court order. It couldn’t be determined if systems that support foreign intelligence surveillance were also vulnerable in the breach.

Not only is this a major intelligence coup for the adversary in question, but it once more reveals the fundamental difficulties in deliberately establishing lawful access/interception systems in communications infrastructures to support law enforcement and national security investigations while, simultaneously, preventing adversaries from taking advantage of the same deliberately-designed communications vulnerabilities.

  1. Or Greece’s 2004 Olympics wiretap scandal. ↩︎
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Writing

Computers-on-Wheels and Web-Based Vulnerabilities

While there can be significant efficiencies gained by increasing the amount of data that is accessible by motor vehicles, connecting these computers-on-wheels to the Internet can have notable consequences.

Recent reporting by Wired reveals, as an example, that:

… a group of independent security researchers revealed that they’d found a flaw in a web portal operated by the carmaker Kia that let the researchers reassign control of the internet-connected features of most modern Kia vehicles—dozens of models representing millions of cars on the road—from the smartphone of a car’s owner to the hackers’ own phone or computer. By exploiting that vulnerability and building their own custom app to send commands to target cars, they were able to scan virtually any internet-connected Kia vehicle’s license plate and within seconds gain the ability to track that car’s location, unlock the car, honk its horn, or start its ignition at will.

…

“If someone cut you off in traffic, you could scan their license plate and then know where they were whenever you wanted and break into their car,” says Curry. “If we hadn’t brought this to Kia’s attention, anybody who could query someone’s license plate could essentially stalk them.” For Kias that come installed with a 360-degree camera, that camera, too, was accessible to hackers. Beyond allowing the hijacking of connected features in cars themselves, Curry says, the web portal flaw also allowed hackers to query a broad range of personal information about Kia customers—names, email addresses, phone numbers, home addresses, and even past driving routes in some cases—a potentially massive data leak.

The nature of the vulnerability is particularly concerning:

When the researchers sent commands directly to the API of that website—the interface that allows users to interact with its underlying data—they say they found that there was nothing preventing them from accessing the privileges of a Kia dealer, such as assigning or reassigning control of the vehicles’ features to any customer account they created.

I do have to admit that I appreciate that this started with discovering issues with APIs used by scooters, which led the researchers to become “super interested in trying more ways to make more things honk.”

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Aside Writing

2024.6.27

For the past many months I’ve had the joy of working with, and learning from, a truly terrific set of colleagues. One of the files we’ve handled has been around law reform in Ontario and specifically Bill 194, the Strengthening Cyber Security and Building Trust in the Public Sector Act.

Our organization’s submission focuses on ways to further improve the legislation by way of offering 28 recommendations that apply to Schedule 1 (concerning cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and technologies affecting individuals under the age of 18) and Schedule 2 (amendments to FIPPA). Broadly, our recommendations concern the levels of accountability, transparency, and oversight that are needed in a rapidly changing world.

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Aside

2024.3.18

It is exceptionally rewarding to see years of research and advocacy while I was at my former employer lead to significant reforms to legislation The effect, thus far, has been to protect residents of Canada from cyber-related threats while, also, imposing checks on otherwise unfettered government power and simultaneously protecting all residents of Canada’s privacy.

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Links Writing

Near-Term Threats Posed by Emergent AI Technologies

A cyberpunk image of a series of hackers that represent the 1970s, the 1980s, the 1990s, the 2000s, and the 2050s.

In January, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) published its assessment of the near-term impact of AI with regards to cyber threats. The whole assessment is worth reading for its clarity and brevity in identifying different ways that AI technologies will be used by high-capacity state actors, by other state and well resourced criminal and mercenary actors, and by comparatively low-skill actors.

A few items which caught my eye:

  • More sophisticated uses of AI in cyber operations are highly likely to be restricted to threat actors with access to quality training data, significant expertise (in both AI and cyber), and resources. More advanced uses are unlikely to be realised before 2025.
  • AI will almost certainly make cyber operations more impactful because threat actors will be able to analyse exfiltrated data faster and more effectively, and use it to train AI models.
  • AI lowers the barrier for novice cyber criminals, hackers-for-hire and hacktivists to carry out effective access and information gathering operations. This enhanced access will likely contribute to the global ransomware threat over the next two years.
  • Cyber resilience challenges will become more acute as the technology develops. To 2025, GenAI and large language models will make it difficult for everyone, regardless of their level of cyber security understanding, to assess whether an email or password reset request is genuine, or to identify phishing, spoofing or social engineering attempts.

There are more insights, such as the value of training data held by high capacity actors and the likelihood that low skill actors will see significant upskilling over the next 18 months due to the availability of AI technologies.

The potential to assess information more quickly may have particularly notable impacts in the national security space, enable more effective corporate espionage operations, as well as enhance cyber criminal activities. In all cases, the ability to assess and query volumes of information at speed and scale will let threat actors extract value from information more efficiently than today.

The fact that the same technologies may enable lower-skilled actors to undertake wider ransomware operations, where it will be challenging to distinguish legitimate versus illegitimate security-related emails, also speaks to the desperate need for organizations to transition to higher-security solutions, including multiple factor authentication or passkeys.

Categories
Links Writing

The Near-Term Impact of AI Technologies and Cyber Threats

In January, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) published its assessment of the near-term impact of AI with regards to cyber threats. The whole assessment is worth reading for its clarity and brevity in identifying different ways that AI technologies will be used by high-capacity state actors, by other state and well resourced criminal and mercenary actors, and by comparatively low-skill actors.

A few items which caught my eye:

  • More sophisticated uses of AI in cyber operations are highly likely to be restricted to threat actors with access to quality training data, significant expertise (in both AI and cyber), and resources. More advanced uses are unlikely to be realised before 2025.
  • AI will almost certainly make cyber operations more impactful because threat actors will be able to analyse exfiltrated data faster and more effectively, and use it to train AI models.
  • AI lowers the barrier for novice cyber criminals, hackers-for-hire and hacktivists to carry out effective access and information gathering operations. This enhanced access will likely contribute to the global ransomware threat over the next two years.
  • Cyber resilience challenges will become more acute as the technology develops. To 2025, GenAI and large language models will make it difficult for everyone, regardless of their level of cyber security understanding, to assess whether an email or password reset request is genuine, or to identify phishing, spoofing or social engineering attempts.

There are more insights, such as the value of training data held by high capacity actors and the likelihood that low skill actors will see significant upskilling over the next 18 months due to the availability of AI technologies.

The potential to assess information more quickly may have particularly notable impacts in the national security space, enable more effective corporate espionage operations, as well as enhance cyber criminal activities. In all cases, the ability to assess and query volumes of information at speed and scale will let threat actors extract value from information more efficiently than today.

The fact that the same technologies may enable lower-skilled actors to undertake wider ransomware operations, where it will be challenging to distinguish legitimate versus illegitimate security-related emails, also speaks to the desperate need for organizations to transition to higher-security solutions, including multiple factor authentication or passkeys.

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Links

Pulling Back the Curtain on the Appin Cyber Mercenary Organization

Curious about what “cyber mercenaries” do? How they operate and facilitate targeting?

This excellent long-form piece from Reuters exquisitely details the history of Appin, an Indian cyber mercenary outfit, and confirms and publicly reveals many of the operations that it has undertaken.

As an aside, the sourcing in this article is particularly impressive, which is to expected from Satter et al. They keep showing they’re amongst the best in the business!

Moreover, the sidenote concerning the NSA’s awareness of the company, and why, is notable in its own right. The authors write,

The National Security Agency (NSA), which spies on foreigners for the U.S. government, began surveilling the company after watching it hack “high value” Pakistani officials around 2009, one of the sources said. An NSA spokesperson declined to comment.

This showcases that Appin may either have been seen as a source of fourth-party collection (i.e. where an intelligence service takes the collection material, as another service is themselves collecting it from a target) or have endangered the NSA’s own collection or targeting activities, on the basis that Appin could provoke targets to assume heightened cybersecurity practices or otherwise cause them to behave in ways that interfered with the NSA’s own operations.

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Russian Cyber Doctrine and Its Implementation

Photo by Mati Mango on Pexels.com

While the following might be a bit bellicose it, at the same time, has a ring of truth to it.

Using a foreign country’s military doctrine to reframe fuck-ups as successes — here, that the Russians’ real operations have had the intended effects — boils down to doing a GRU colonel’s work for him; placating Gerasimov about whether or not the O6’s department has contributed to winning the war, among other things.

The Russian government and its various agencies have been incredibly active in attempting to influence or affect the ability of the Ukrainian government to resist the illegal Russian invasion of its territory. But at the same time there has been a back and forth about the successes or failures of Russia in largely academic or public policy circles. In at least some cases, these arguments seem to argue for the successes of the Russian doctrine without sufficient evidence to maintain the position.

Notwithstanding the value of some of those debates it’s nice to see a line of critique that is more attentive to the structure of institutions and what often drives them, with the affect of broadening the rationales and explanations for the (un)successful efforts in the cyber domain by Russian forces.

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Links

Cybersecurity and White Labelled Android Devices

Trend Micro has a nice short piece on the challenges of assessing the security properties of various components of Android devices. In short, white labelling incentivizes device manufacturers to invest the least amount possible in what they’re building for the brands that will sell devices to consumers. Trend Micro included this very nice little mention on the shenanigans that firmware developers can get up to:

Firmware developers supplying the OEM might agree to provide the software at a lower cost because they can compensate the lost profit through questionable means, for example by discreetly pre-installing apps from other app developers for a fee. There is a whole market built around this bundling service with prices ranging from 1 to 10 Chinese yuan (approximately US$0.14 to US$1.37 as of this writing) per application per device. This is where the risk is: As long as the firmware, packaged apps, and update mechanisms of the device are not owned, controlled, or audited by the smartphone brand itself, a rogue supplier can hide unauthorized code therein.1

While the authors suggest a range of policy options, from SBOMs to placing requirements on device transparency before administrators ‘trust’ devices, I’m not confident of these suggestions’ efficacy when taking a broader look at who principally uses white labelled devices. There are economics at play: should all devices have increased input costs associated with greater traceability and accountability then it will place financial pressures on the individuals in society who are most likely to be purchasing these devices. I doubt that upper-middle class individuals will be particularly affected by restricting the availability of many white labelled Android devices but such restrictions would almost certainly have disproportionate impacts on less affluent members of society or those who are, by necessity, price conscious. Should these individuals have to pay more for the computing power that they may depend on for a wide range of tasks—and in excess of how more affluent members of society use their devices?

Security has long been a property that individuals with more money can more easily ‘acquire’, and those who are less affluent have been less able to possess similar quantities or qualities of security in the services and products that they own. I understand and appreciate (and want to agree with) the Trend Micro analysts on how to alleviate some of the worse security properties associated with white labelled devices but it seems as though any such calculation needs to undertake a broader intersectional analysis. It’s possible that at the conclusion of such an analysis you still arrive at similar security-related concerns but would, also, include a number of structural social change policy prescriptions as preconditions that must be met before heightened security can be made more equitably available to more members of society.

  1. Emphasis added. ↩︎