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Location Data Used to Drive Anti-Abortion Campaigns

It can be remarkably easy to target communications to individuals’ based on their personal location. Location information is often surreptitiously obtained by way of smartphone apps that sell off or otherwise provide this data to data brokers, or through agreements with telecommunications vendors that enable targeting based on mobile devices’ geolocation. 

Senator Wyden’s efforts to investigate this brokerage economy recently revealed how this sensitive geolocation information was used to enable and drive anti-abortion activism in the United States:

Wyden’s letter asks the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate Near Intelligence, a location data provider that gathered and sold the information. The company claims to have information on 1.6 billion people across 44 countries, according to its website.

The company’s data can be used to target ads to people who have been to specific locations — including reproductive health clinic locations, according to Recrue Media co-founder Steven Bogue, who told Wyden’s staff his firm used the company’s data for a national anti-abortion ad blitz between 2019 and 2022.



In a February 2023 filing, the company said it ensures that the data it obtains was collected with the users’ permission, but Near’s former chief privacy officer Jay Angelo told Wyden’s staff that the company collected and sold data about people without consent, according to the letter.

While the company stopped selling location data belonging to Europeans, it continued for Americans because of a lack of federal privacy regulations.

While the company in question, Near Intelligence, declared bankruptcy in December 2023 there is a real potential for the data they collected to be sold to other parties as part of bankruptcy proceedings. There is a clear and present need to legislate how geolocation information is collected, used, as well as disclosed to address this often surreptitious aspect of the data brokerage economy.

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Links Writing

The Near-Term Impact of AI Technologies and Cyber Threats

In January, the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) published its assessment of the near-term impact of AI with regards to cyber threats. The whole assessment is worth reading for its clarity and brevity in identifying different ways that AI technologies will be used by high-capacity state actors, by other state and well resourced criminal and mercenary actors, and by comparatively low-skill actors.

A few items which caught my eye:

  • More sophisticated uses of AI in cyber operations are highly likely to be restricted to threat actors with access to quality training data, significant expertise (in both AI and cyber), and resources. More advanced uses are unlikely to be realised before 2025.
  • AI will almost certainly make cyber operations more impactful because threat actors will be able to analyse exfiltrated data faster and more effectively, and use it to train AI models.
  • AI lowers the barrier for novice cyber criminals, hackers-for-hire and hacktivists to carry out effective access and information gathering operations. This enhanced access will likely contribute to the global ransomware threat over the next two years.
  • Cyber resilience challenges will become more acute as the technology develops. To 2025, GenAI and large language models will make it difficult for everyone, regardless of their level of cyber security understanding, to assess whether an email or password reset request is genuine, or to identify phishing, spoofing or social engineering attempts.

There are more insights, such as the value of training data held by high capacity actors and the likelihood that low skill actors will see significant upskilling over the next 18 months due to the availability of AI technologies.

The potential to assess information more quickly may have particularly notable impacts in the national security space, enable more effective corporate espionage operations, as well as enhance cyber criminal activities. In all cases, the ability to assess and query volumes of information at speed and scale will let threat actors extract value from information more efficiently than today.

The fact that the same technologies may enable lower-skilled actors to undertake wider ransomware operations, where it will be challenging to distinguish legitimate versus illegitimate security-related emails, also speaks to the desperate need for organizations to transition to higher-security solutions, including multiple factor authentication or passkeys.

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Pulling Back the Curtain on the Appin Cyber Mercenary Organization

Curious about what “cyber mercenaries” do? How they operate and facilitate targeting?

This excellent long-form piece from Reuters exquisitely details the history of Appin, an Indian cyber mercenary outfit, and confirms and publicly reveals many of the operations that it has undertaken.

As an aside, the sourcing in this article is particularly impressive, which is to expected from Satter et al. They keep showing they’re amongst the best in the business!

Moreover, the sidenote concerning the NSA’s awareness of the company, and why, is notable in its own right. The authors write,

The National Security Agency (NSA), which spies on foreigners for the U.S. government, began surveilling the company after watching it hack “high value” Pakistani officials around 2009, one of the sources said. An NSA spokesperson declined to comment.

This showcases that Appin may either have been seen as a source of fourth-party collection (i.e. where an intelligence service takes the collection material, as another service is themselves collecting it from a target) or have endangered the NSA’s own collection or targeting activities, on the basis that Appin could provoke targets to assume heightened cybersecurity practices or otherwise cause them to behave in ways that interfered with the NSA’s own operations.

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Links Photography

A Century Caught on Camera

The Globe and Mail has a terrific photographic series entitled "A century caught on camera." As a Toronto resident I was struck by just how many traditions, rituals, and grievances have stuck with the city–or in the city–for over a century.

Further, the way in which the images have been captured has changed substantially over time as a result of the technical capacity of camera equipment, along with the interests or preferences of the photographers at different times. Images in the past decade or two, as an example, clearly draw more commonly from celebrity or artistic portraiture than 50 years ago. Moreover, it’s pretty impressive just how much photographers have done with their equipment over the past century and this, generally, speaks to how easy street and documentary photographers have it today as compared to when our compatriots were using slow lenses and film.

It may take you quite a while to get through all the images but I found the process to be exceedingly worthwhile. Though I admit that the first decade during which the Globe used colour images probably ranks as my least favourite period in the galleries that the paper has published.

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Links Writing

Generative AI Technologies and Emerging Wicked Policy Problems

While some emerging generative technologies may positively affect various domains (e.g., certain aspects of drug discovery and biological research, efficient translation between certain languages, speeding up certain administrative tasks, etc) they are, also, enabling new forms of harmful activities. Case in point, some individuals and groups are using generative technologies to generate child sexual abuse or exploitation materials:

Sexton says criminals are using older versions of AI models and fine-tuning them to create illegal material of children. This involves feeding a model existing abuse images or photos of people’s faces, allowing the AI to create images of specific individuals. “We’re seeing fine-tuned models which create new imagery of existing victims,” Sexton says. Perpetrators are “exchanging hundreds of new images of existing victims” and making requests about individuals, he says. Some threads on dark web forums share sets of faces of victims, the research says, and one thread was called: “Photo Resources for AI and Deepfaking Specific Girls.”

… realism also presents potential problems for investigators who spend hours trawling through abuse images to classify them and help identify victims. Analysts at the IWF, according to the organization’s new report, say the quality has improved quickly—although there are still some simple signs that images may not be real, such as extra fingers or incorrect lighting. “I am also concerned that future images may be of such good quality that we won’t even notice,” says one unnamed analyst quoted in the report.

The ability to produce generative child abuse content is becoming a wicked problem with few (if any) “good” solutions. It will be imperative for policy professionals to learn from past situations where technologies were found to sometimes facilitate child abuse related harms. In doing so, these professionals will need to draw lessons concerning what kinds of responses demonstrate necessity and proportionality with respect to the emergent harms of the day.

As just one example, we will have to carefully consider how generative AI-created child sexual abuse content is similar to, and distinctive from, past policy debates on the policing of online child sexual abuse content. Such care in developing policy responses will be needed to address these harms and to avoid undertaking performative actions that do little to address the underlying issues that drive this kind of behaviour.

Relatedly, we must also beware the promise that past (ineffective) solutions will somehow address the newest wicked problem. Novel solutions that are custom built to generative systems may be needed, and these solutions must simultaneously protect our privacy, Charter, and human rights while mitigating harms. Doing anything less will, at best, “merely” exchange one class of emergent harms for others.

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Addressing Disinformation and Other Harms Using Generative DRM

The ideas behind this initiative—that a metadata-powered glyph will appear above or around content produced by generative AI technologies to inform individuals of the providence of content they come across—depend on a number of somewhat improbable things.

  1. A whole computing infrastructure based on tracking metadata reliably and then presenting it to users in ways they understand and care about, and which is adopted by the masses.
  2. That generative outputs will need to remain the exception as opposed to the norm: when generative image manipulation (not full image creation) is normal then how much will this glyph help to notify people of ‘fake’ imagery or other content?
  3. That there are sufficiently low benefits to offering metadata-stripping or content-modification or content-creation systems that there are no widespread or easy-to-adopt ways of removing the identifying metadata from generative content.

Finally, where the intent behind fraudulent media is to intimidate, embarrass, or harass (e.g., non-consensual deepfake pornographic content, violence content), then what will the glyph in question do to allay these harms? I suspect very little unless it is, also, used to identify individuals who create content for the purposes of addressing criminal or civil offences. And, if that’s the case, then the outputs would constitute a form of data that are designed to deliberately enable state intervention in private life, which could raise a series of separate, unique, and difficult to address problems.

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Highlights from TBS’ Guidance on Publicly Available Information

The Treasury Board Secretariat has released, “Privacy Implementation Notice 2023-03: Guidance pertaining to the collection, use, retention and disclosure of personal information that is publicly available online.”

This is an important document, insofar as it clarifies a legal grey space in Canadian federal government policies. Some of the Notice’s highlights include:

  1. Clarifies (some may assert expand) how government agencies can collect, use, retain, or disclose publicly available online information (PAOI). This includes from commercial data brokers or online social networking services
  2. PAOI can be collected for administrative or non-administrative purposes, including for communications and outreach, research purposes, or facilitating law enforcement or intelligence operations
  3. Overcollection is an acknowledged problem that organizations should address. Notably, “[a]s a general rule, [PAOI] disclosed online by inadvertence, leak, hack or theft should not be considered [PAOI] as the disclosure, by its very nature, would have occurred without the knowledge or consent of the individual to whom the personal information pertains; thereby intruding upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.”
  4. Notice of collection should be undertaken, though this may not occur due to some investigations or uses of PAOI
  5. Third-parties collecting PAOI on the behalf of organizations should be assessed. Organizations should ensure PAOI is being legitimately and legally obtained
  6. “[I]nstitutions can no longer, without the consent of the individual to whom the information relates, use the [PAOI] except for the purpose for which the information was originally obtained or for a use consistent with that purpose”
  7. Organizations are encouraged to assess their confidence in PAOI’s accuracy and potentially evaluate collected information against several data sources to confidence
  8. Combinations of PAOI can be used to create an expanded profile that may amplify the privacy equities associated with the PAOI or profile
  9. Retained PAOI should be denoted with “publicly available information” to assist individuals in determining whether it is useful for an initial, or continuing, use or disclosure
  10. Government legal officers should be consulted prior to organizations collecting PAOI from websites or services that explicitly bar either data scraping or governments obtaining information from them
  11. There are number pieces of advice concerning the privacy protections that should be applied to PAOI. These include: ensuring there is authorization to collect PAOI, assessing the privacy implications of the collection, adopting privacy preserving techniques (e.g., de-identification or data minimization), adopting internal policies, as well as advice around using attributable versus non-attributable accounts to obtain publicly available information
  12. Organizations should not use profile information from real persons. Doing otherwise runs the risk of an organization violating s. 366 (Forgery) or s.403 (Fraudulently impersonate another person) of the Criminal Code
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The Women Behind AI Ethics

Rolling Stone has an excellent article that profiles the women who have been at the forefront of warning how contemporary AI systems can be, and are being, used to (re)inscribe bias, discrimination, sexism, and racism into contemporary and emerging digital tools and systems. An important read that is well worth your time.

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New Details About Russia’s Surveillance Infrastructure

Writing for the New York Times, Krolik, Mozur, and Satariano have published new details about the state of Russia’s telecommunications surveillance capacity. They include documentary evidence in some cases of what these technologies can do, including the ability to:

  • identify if mobile phones are proximate to one another to detect meetups
  • identify whether a person’s phone is proximate to a burner phone, to de-anonymize the latter
  • use deep packet inspection systems to target particular kinds of communications metadata associated with secure communications applications

These types of systems are appearing in various repressive states and are being used by their governments.

Similar systems have long been developed in advanced Western democratic countries which leads me to wonder whether what we’re seeing from authoritarian countries will ultimately usher in the use of similar technologies in higher rule-of-law states or if, instead, Western companies will merely export the tools without them being adopted in the countries developing them.

In effect, will the long-term result of revealing authoritarian capabilities lead to the gradual legitimization of their use in democratic countries so long as using them is tied to judicial oversight?

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Critically Assessing AI Technologies’ Economic Potentials

This article by Ramani and Wang, entitled “Why transformative AI is really, really hard to achieve,” is probably the best critical economic analysis of the current AI debates I’ve come across. It assesses what would be required for AI technologies to live up to the current hype cycles about how these technologies will massively benefit economic productivity. Based on the nature of AI technologies being developed, combined with the history of economic productivity enhancements over time, the authors conclude that the present day hype is unlikely to be met.

Key to the arguments is that AI technologies do not, as of yet, sufficiently automate a vast set of tasks which are comparatively easy for humans to accomplish, nor are they able to benefit from the latent knowledge and intelligence that guides humans in their daily lives. The authors argue that AI technologies must broadly automate tasks, instead of discretely automating them, in order to achieve cross-industry improvements to productivity. Doing otherwise will merely accelerate aspects of processes which will remain gridlocked in the aggregate by more traditional or less automated processes.

The authors are not dismissing the potential utility of AI technologies, however, but instead just arguing that they are not as likely to achieve the transformative economic miracles that many are suggesting are just around the corner. However, even if AI systems are ‘only’ as significant for productivity as the combustion engine (which discretely as opposed to comprehensively enhanced productivity) this would be a significant accomplishment.