Tag: Canada

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Amendments in Bill C-2 Would Establish an Intelligence Role for the Canadian Coast Guard

While much of the attention around Canada’s Bill C-2: An Act respecting certain measures relating to the security of the border between Canada and the United States and respecting other related security measures has focused on its lawful access and interception aspects, one notable change has flown under the radar: amendments to the Oceans Act that quietly expand the Canadian Coast Guard’s mandate to include intelligence functions.

Specifically, the bill proposes updating the Coast Guard’s responsibilities to include:

security, including security patrols and the collection, analysis and disclosure of information or intelligence.1

This language, paired with provisions granting the Minister explicit authority to collect, analyze, and disclose intelligence,2 marks a meaningful shift. The update would echo the U.S. model, where the Coast Guard is both a maritime safety organization and an intelligence actor. The U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) has long played a dual role in maritime domain awareness and national security operations.

Why does this matter?

There are a few strategic implications:
1. NATO and National Security Alignment: The expanded role may help Canada meet NATO funding expectations, especially where the Coast Guard is deployed to conduct maritime surveillance and to maintain an Arctic presence.
2. Statutory Authority: These changes might establish a legal basis for intelligence collection practices that are already occurring, but until now may have lacked clear legislative grounding.
3. Redundancy and Resilience: With global intelligence sharing under strain, having a domestic maritime intelligence function could serve as a backstop if access to allied intelligence is reduced.
4. Northern Operations: Coast Guard vessels, which are not militarized like Royal Canadian Navy warships, are well-positioned to operate in the Arctic and northern waters, offering intelligence capabilities without the geopolitical weight of a military presence.

To be clear, this wouldn’t transform the Canadian Coast Guard into an intelligence agency. But it would give the institution statutory authorities that, until now, have not explicitly been within its official purview.

It’s a small clause in a big bill, but one worth watching. As researchers, journalists, and civil society take a closer look at Bill C-2, this expansion of maritime intelligence authority could (and should) draw more attention.

  1. 30(2) of C-2, amending 41(1)(f) of the Oceans Act ↩︎
  2. 30(2) of C-2, amending 41(2) of the Oceans Act ↩︎
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Research Security Requirements and Ontario Colleges and Universities

There’s a lot happening, legislatively in Ontario. One item worth highlighting concerns the requirement for Ontario colleges and universities to develop security research plans.

The federal government has been warning that Canadian academic research is at risk of exfiltration or theft by foreign actors, including by foreign-influenced professors or students who work in Canadian research environments, or by way of electronic and trade-based espionage. In response, the federal government has established a series of guidance documents that Canadian researchers and universities are expected to adhere to where seeking certain kinds of federal funding.

The Ontario government introduced Bill 33, Supporting Children and Students Act, 2025 on May 29, 2025. Notably, Schedule 3 introduces requirements for security plans for Ontario college of applied arts and technology and publicly funded university.

The relevant text from the legislation states as follows:

Research security plan

Application

20.1 (1) This section applies to every college of applied arts and technology and to every publicly-assisted university.

Development and implementation of plan

(2) Every college or university described in subsection (1) shall develop and implement a research security plan to safeguard, and mitigate the risk of harm to or interference with, its research activities.

Minister’s directive

(3) The Minister may, from time to time, in a directive issued to one or more colleges or universities described in subsection (1),

(a) specify the date by which a college or university’s research security plan must be developed and implemented under subsection (2);

(b) specify the date by which a plan must be provided to the Minister under subsection (4) and any requirements relating to updating or revising a plan; and

(c) specify topics to be addressed or elements to be included in a plan and the date by which they must be addressed.

Review by Minister

(4) Every college or university described in subsection (1) shall provide the Minister with a copy of its research security plan and any other information or reports requested by the Minister in respect of research security.

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Implications for Canada of an Anti-Liberal Democratic USA

Any number of commentators have raised concerns over whether the USA could become an illiberal state and the knock on effects. A recent piece by Dr. Benjamin Goldsmith briefly discussed a few forms of such a reformed state apparatus, but more interestingly (to me) is his postulation of the potentially broader global effects:

  • The dominant ideology of great powers will be nationalism.  
  • International politics will resemble the realist vision of great powers balancing power, carving out spheres of influence.  
  • It will make sense for the illiberal great powers to cooperate in some way to thwart liberalism – a sort of new ‘Holy Alliance’ type system could emerge.  
  • The existing institutional infrastructure of international relations will move towards a state-centric bias, away from a human-rights, liberal bias.   
  • International economic interdependence, although curtailed since the days of high “globalisation,” will continue to play an important role in tempering great-power behaviour.  
  • Democracy will be under greater pressure globally, with no great power backing and perhaps active US encouragement of far-right illiberal parties in established and new democracies.  
  • Mass Politics and soft power will still matter, but the post-truth aspect of public opinion in foreign policy will be greater.  

For a middle state like Canada, this kind of transformation would fundamentally challenge how it has been able to operate for the past 80 years. This would follow from the effects of this international reordering and due to our proximity to a superpower state that has broadly adopted or accepted an anti-liberal democratic political culture.

Concerning the first, what does this international reordering mean for Canada when nationalism reigns supreme after decades of developing economic and cultural integrations with the USA? What might it mean to be under a ‘sphere of influence’ with an autocratic or illiberal country? How would Canada appease Americans who pushed our leaders to support other authoritarian governments, or else? Absent the same commitments (and resources) to advocate for democratic values and human rights (while recognizing America’s own missteps in those areas) what does it mean for Canada’s own potential foreign policy commitments? And in an era of rising adoptions of generative AI technologies that can be used to produce and spread illiberal or anti-democratic rhetoric, and without the USA to regulate such uses of these technologies, what does this mean for detecting truth and falsity in international discourse?

In aggregate, these are the sorts of questions that Canadians should be considering and is part of why our leaders are warning of the implications of the changing American political culture.

When it comes to our proximity to a growing anti-liberal democratic political cultural, we are already seeing some of those principles and rhetoric taking hold in Canada. As more of this language (and ideology) seeps into Canadian discourse there is a growing chance that Canada’s own democratic norms might be perverted with extended exposure and following American pressures to compel alterations in our democratic institutions.

The shifts in the USA were not entirely unexpected. And the implications have been previously theorized. An anti-liberal democratic political culture will not necessarily take hold amongstAmericans and their political institutions. But the implications and potential global effects of such a change are before us, today, and it’s important to carefully consider potential consequences. Middle states, such as Canada, that possess liberal democratic cultures must urgently prepare ways to plot through what may be a very chaotic and disturbing next few decades.

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An Initial Assessment of CLOUD Agreements

The United States has bilateral CLOUD Act agreements with the United Kingdom and Australia, and Canada continues to also negotiate an agreement with the United States.1 CLOUD agreements are meant to alleviate some of the challenges attributed to the MLAT process, namely that MLATs can be ponderous with the result being that investigators have difficulties obtaining information from communication providers in a manner deemed timely.

Investigators must conform with their domestic legal requirements and, with CLOUD agreements in place, can serve orders directly on bilateral partners’ communications and electronic service providers. Orders cannot target the domestic residents of a targeted country (i.e., the UK government could not target a US resident or person, and vice versa). Demands also cannot interfere with fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech. 2

A recent report from Lawfare unpacks the November 2024 report that was produced to explain how the UK and USA governments actually used the powers under their bilateral agreement. It showcases that, so far, the UK government has used this substantially to facilitate wiretap requests, with the UK issuing,

… 20,142 requests to U.S. service providers under the agreement. Over 99.8 percent of those (20,105) were issued under the Investigatory Powers Act, and were for the most part wiretap orders, and fewer than 0.2 percent were overseas production orders for stored communications data (37).

By way of contrast, the “United States made 63 requests to U.K. providers between Oct. 3, 2022, and Oct. 15, 2024. All but one request was for stored information.” Challenges in getting UK providers to respond to US CLOUD Act requests, and American complaints about this, may cause the UK government to “amend the data protection law to remove any doubt about the legality of honoring CLOUD Act requests.”

It will be interesting to further assess how CLOUD Acts operate, in practice, at a time when there is public analysis of how the USA-Australia agreement has been put into effect.

  1. In Canada, the Canadian Bar Association noted in November 2024 that new enabling legislation may be required, including reforms of privacy legislation to authorize providers’ disclosure of information to American investigators. ↩︎
  2. Debates continue about whether protections built into these agreements are sufficient. ↩︎
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American Telecommunication Companies’ Cybersecurity Deficiencies Increasingly Apparent

Five Eyes countries have regularly and routinely sought, and gained, access to foreign telecommunications infrastructures to carry out their operations. The same is true of other well resourced countries, including China.

Salt Typhoon’s penetration of American telecommunications and email platforms is slowly coming into relief. The New York Times has an article that summarizes what is being publicly disclosed at this point in time:

  • The full list of phone numbers that the Department of Justice had under surveillance in lawful interception systems has been exposed, with the effect of likely undermining American counter-intelligence operations aimed at Chinese operatives
  • Phone calls, unencrypted SMS messages, and email providers have been compromised
  • The FBI has heightened concerns that informants may have been exposed
  • Apple’s services, as well as end to end encrypted systems, were not penetrated

American telecommunications networks were penetrated, in part, due to companies relying on decades old systems and equipment that do not meet modern security requirements. Fixing these deficiencies may require rip-and-replacing some old parts of the network with the effect of creating “painful network outages for consumers.” Some of the targeting of American telecommunications networks is driven by an understanding that American national security defenders have some restrictions on how they can operate on American-based systems.

The weaknesses of telecommunications networks and their associated systems are generally well known. And mobile systems are particularly vulnerable to exploitation as a result of archaic standards and an unwillingness by some carriers to activate the security-centric aspects of 4G and 5G standards.

Some of the Five Eyes, led by Canada, have been developing and deploying defensive sensor networks that are meant to shore up some defences of government and select non-government organizations.1 But these edge, network, and cloud based sensors can only do so much: telecommunications providers, themselves, need to prioritize ensuring their core networks are protected against the classes of adversaries trying to penetrate them.2

At the same time, it is worth recognizing that end to end communications continued to be protected even in the face of Salt Typhoon’s actions. This speaks the urgent need to ensure that these forms of communications security continue to be available to all users. We often read that law enforcement needs select access to such communications and that they can be trusted to not abuse such exceptional access.

Setting aside the vast range of legal, normative, or geopolitical implications of weakening end to end encryption, cyber operations like the one perpetrated by Salt Typhoon speak to governments’ collective inabilities to protect their lawful access systems. There’s no reason to believe they’d be any more able to protect exceptional access measures that weakened, or otherwise gained access to, select content of end to end encrypted communications.

  1. I have discussed these sensors elsewhere, including in “Unpacking NSICOP’s Special Report on the Government of Canada’s Framework and Activities to Defend its Systems and Networks from Cyber Attack”. Historical information about these sensors, which were previously referred to under the covernames of CASCADE, EONBLUE, and PHOTONICPRISM, is available at the SIGINT summaries. ↩︎
  2. We are seeing some governments introducing, and sometimes passing, laws that would foster more robust security requirements. In Canada, Bill C-26 is generally meant to do this though the legislation as introduced raised some serious concerns. ↩︎
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Intelligence Commissioner Raises Concerns About Canada’s Federal Cybersecurity Legislation

Earlier this week the Intelligence Commissioner (IC) appeared at the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs on Bill C-26, along with federal Privacy Commissioner. The bill is intended to enhance the cybersecurity requirements that critical infrastructure providers must adopt.

The IC’s remarks are now public. He made four very notable comments in his opening remarks:

  1. The IC warned that the proposed amendments to the Telecom Act would allow the minister to essentially compel the production of any information in support of orders. This information could include personal information – which under broad exceptions, could then be widely disclosed.
  2. Part 2 allows for the regulators to carry out the equivalent of unwarranted searches – where again, personal information could be collected.
  3. The CSE will play a vital role and will be the holder of this information, in a technological form or otherwise, which will contain elements for which we have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
  4. In light of the invasive nature of the Bill, he asserted that it is important that meaningful safeguards be part of the legislation so that Canadians have confidence in the cybersecurity system.

His responses to comments at committee — not yet available through Hansard — made even more clear that he believed that amendments are needed to integrate appropriate oversight and accountability measures into the legislation. The IC’s comments, combined with those of the federal Privacy Commissioner of Canada and civil society representatives, constitute a clear warning to senators about the potential implications of the legislation.

It will be interesting to see how they respond.

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Emerging Trends from Canadian Privacy Regulators and Cybersecurity Legislation?

Earlier this evening, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) appeared before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs on the topic of Bill C-26: An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts.

While at Committee, Commissioner Dufresne recognized the value of making explicit the OPC’s oversight role concerning the legislation. He, also, reaffirmed the importance of requiring any collection, use, or disclosure of personal information to be both necessary and proportionate. And should the Standing Committee decline to adopt this amendment they were advised to, at a minimum, include a requirement that data only be retained for as long as necessary. Government institutions should also be required to undertake privacy impact assessments and consult with the OPC.

Finally, in cases of cyber incidents that may result in a material breach, his office should be notified; this could entail the OPC being notified by the Communications Security Establishment based on a real risk of significant harm standard. Information sharing agreements should also be put in place that provide minimum privacy safeguards while also strengthening governance and accountability processes.

The safeguards the OPC are calling for are important and, also, overlap with many of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario’s (written submission, Commissioner Kosseim’s oral remarks) concerning the provincial government’s Bill 194, Strengthening Cyber Security and Building Trust in the Public Sector Act, 2024.

Should other Canadian jurisdictions propose their own cybersecurity legislation to protect critical infrastructure and regulated bodies it will be interesting to monitor for the consistency in the amendments called for by Canada’s privacy regulators.

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Encryption Use Hits a New Height in Canada

In a continuing demonstration of the importance of strong and privacy-protective communications, the federal Foreign Interference Commission has created a Signal account to receive confidential information.

Encrypted Messaging
For those who may feel more comfortable providing information to the Commission using encrypted means, they may do so through the Signal – Private Messenger app. Those who already have a Signal account can contact the Commission using our username below. Others will have to first download the app and set up an account before they can communicate with the Commission.

The Commission’s Signal Username is signal_pifi_epie20.24

Signal users can also scan QR Code below for the Commission’s username:

The Commission has put strict measures in place to protect the confidentiality of any information provided through this Signal account.

Not so long ago, the Government of Canada was arguing for an irresponsible encryption policy that included the ability to backdoor end-to-end encryption. It’s hard to overstate the significance of a government body now explicitly adopting Signal.

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Russian State Media Disinformation Campaign Exposed

Today, a series of Western allies — including Canada, the United States, and the Netherlands — disclosed the existence of a sophisticated Russian social media influence operation that was being operated by RT. The details of the campaign are exquisite, and include some of code used to drive the operation.

Of note, the campaign used a covert artificial intelligence (AI) enhanced software package to create fictitious online personas, representing a number of nationalities, to post content on X (formerly Twitter). Using this tool, RT affiliates disseminated disinformation to and about a number of countries, including the United States, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Ukraine, and Israel.

Although the tool was only identified on X, the authoring organizations’ analysis of the software used for the campaign indicated the developers intended to expand its functionality to other social media platforms. The authoring organizations’ analysis also indicated the tool is capable of the following:

  1. Creating authentic appearing social media personas en masse;
  2. Deploying content similar to typical social media users;
  3. Mirroring disinformation of other bot personas;
  4. Perpetuating the use of pre-existing false narratives to amplify malign foreign influence; and
  5. Formulating messages, to include the topic and framing, based on the specific archetype of the bot.

Mitigations to address this influence campaign include:

  1. Consider implementing processes to validate that accounts are created and operated by a human person who abides by the platform’s respective terms of use. Such processes could be similar to well-established Know Your Customer guidelines.
  2. Consider reviewing and making upgrades to authentication and verification processes based on the information provided in this advisory;
  3. Consider protocols for identifying and subsequently reviewing users with known-suspicious user agent strings;
  4. Consider making user accounts Secure by Default by using default settings such as MFA, default settings that support privacy, removing personally identifiable information shared without consent, and clear documentation of acceptable behavior.

This is a continuation of how AI tools are being (and will be) used to expand the ability of actors to undertake next-generation digital influence campaigns. And while adversaries are found using these techniques, today, we should anticipate that private companies (and others) will offer similar capabilities in the near future in democratic and non-democratic countries alike.

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Aside Writing

2024.6.27

For the past many months I’ve had the joy of working with, and learning from, a truly terrific set of colleagues. One of the files we’ve handled has been around law reform in Ontario and specifically Bill 194, the Strengthening Cyber Security and Building Trust in the Public Sector Act.

Our organization’s submission focuses on ways to further improve the legislation by way of offering 28 recommendations that apply to Schedule 1 (concerning cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and technologies affecting individuals under the age of 18) and Schedule 2 (amendments to FIPPA). Broadly, our recommendations concern the levels of accountability, transparency, and oversight that are needed in a rapidly changing world.